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1121 
DOES SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE DELIVER 
GROUP BENEFITS? AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF 
ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE 
John Aloysius Cogan Jr.* 
Abstract: The small group health insurance market is failing. Today, fewer than one-third 
of small firms now offer health insurance and the number of people covered by small group 
insurance continues to drop. These problems invite the obvious question: What should be 
done about the small group market? Past scholarship on the small group market has largely 
focused on documenting the market’s problems, evaluating the effectiveness of prior reform 
efforts, and proposing regulatory changes to stabilize the market. This Article takes a 
different approach to the small group problem by asking a previously unasked question: Does 
the small group market deliver group insurance benefits? Group insurance, first established 
in the life insurance industry, came about because it offered insureds a better deal than 
individual coverage. Group insurance provided four core benefits: reduced adverse selection, 
lower administrative costs, greater access to insurance, and tax-subsidized premiums. This 
Article argues the small group market largely fails to deliver the core benefits of group 
coverage. For many, the small group market offers no better deal than the individual market. 
Given these findings, it is hard to justify further interventions to save the small group market. 
The decline and dissolution of the small group market would likely shift millions to the 
individual market, resulting in a substantially larger and more stable individual market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The small group health insurance market,1 covering employers with 
fifty or fewer employees,2 is failing. Despite repeated legislative efforts 
to reform the small group market stretching back nearly three decades, 
including substantial changes under the Affordable Care Act (ACA),3 
the steady decline of the small group market continues. Only 29% of 
small employers now offer health insurance coverage to their 
employees,4 down from 51% in the mid-1990s.5 Small group enrollment 
                                                     
1. The large and small group health insurance markets offer fully insured coverage. This means 
the employer purchases a health insurance policy to cover its employees from a state-licensed 
insurer. In exchange for a premium payment by the employer, the insurer bears the full risk for all 
claims covered by the policy. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or 
“One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 
(2005). In contrast, self-insured (also called self-funded) employer groups do not purchase health 
insurance. Instead, they bear the risk, at least partially, of the health care expenses of their 
employees through an insurance-like employee benefit plan. Id. 
2. Prior to the ACA, the large employer group market consisted of employers with fifty-one or 
more employees, and the small employer group market consisted of employers with fifty or fewer 
employees. The ACA amended these definitions to enlarge the small employer group market to 
include employers with up to 100 employees as of January 1, 2016. Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1304(a)(3)(b)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). Congress later amended the ACA to retain the 
original definitions of large and small group employers. Protecting Affordable Coverage for 
Employees Act, Pub. L. 114-60, § 2(a)(1)–(2), 129 Stat. 543 (2015) (codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). Four states—California, Colorado, New York, and Vermont—currently extend their 
small group market to cover employers with up to 100 employees. Sabrina Corlette et al., Repeal of 
Small-Business Provision of the ACA Creates Natural Experiment in States, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/mar/repeal-of-
small-business-provision-of-the-aca [https://perma.cc/DE2G-5GVC]. 
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
4. 2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary 
Tables, Table I.A.2 Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance by Firm 
Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2016), AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & 
QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2016), https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_ 
tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tia2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR7V-8GRR] (reporting that only 
28.6% of private-sector firms with less than fifty employees offered health insurance coverage). 
5. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Small Employers and the Health Insurance Market, HEALTH 
AFF., Jan. 1994, at 149, 150 (noting that 51% of small businesses offered health insurance in 1993). 
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has also declined significantly, dropping to 14.7 million people in 
20156—a loss of nearly 3.5 million since 2012.7 
The small group market’s history of poor performance has stimulated 
considerable scholarship, much of it focused on evaluating reform 
efforts and proposing regulatory changes to stabilize the market.8 
Scholarship and policy analysis following passage of the ACA has 
largely travelled down the same path, with some arguing that the small 
group market should be protected from further decline.9 This Article 
takes a different approach to the small group market. It poses a central 
but previously unexplored question: Does the small group market deliver 
group insurance benefits? Group insurance came about for a single 
reason: it offered insureds a better deal than individual coverage. If small 
                                                     
6. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2015 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE: 
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 6 fig.4 (2017) [hereinafter MILLIMAN 2015], 
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/2015-commercial-health-insurance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5WL-JBDF]. 
7. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS, MILLIMAN, 2012 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE: OVERVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL RESULTS 1 fig.1 (2013) [hereinafter MILLIMAN 2012], 
http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/healthreform/ 
2012-commerical-health-insurance-financial-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAC9-3XH7] (reporting 
18.1 million covered lives in the small group market in 2012). 
8. See, e.g., Rick Curtis et al., Health Insurance Reform in the Small-Group Market, HEALTH 
AFF. May-June 1999, at 151 (examining the scope and development of small group health insurance 
rating laws in the 1990s); Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance 
Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685 (1999) (evaluating how small group health insurance 
reform laws affected competition among insurers); Catherine G. McLaughlin & Wendy K. Zellers, 
The Shortcomings of Voluntarism in the Small-Group Insurance Market, HEALTH AFF., Summer 
1992, at 28 (assessing results of health care financing projects for small businesses); Alan C. 
Monheit & Barbara Steinberg Schone, How Has Small Group Market Reform Affected Employee 
Health Insurance Coverage?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 237 (2003) (evaluating effects of small group 
reforms in the 1990s); Olympia J. Snowe, Small Business Health Plans: A Critical Step in Solving 
the Small Business Health Care Crisis, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231 (2006) (arguing in favor of 
proposed legislation that would allow small businesses to offer association-sponsored health 
insurance). 
9. See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers Under 
the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 539 
(2013) (analyzing the problems self-insurance poses to the small-group market and proposing 
legislative solutions); Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935 (2013) (proposing solutions to “save” the small group market 
from instability after the ACA takes effect); Matthew Buettgens & Linda J. Blumberg, Small Firm 
Self-Insurance Under the Affordable Care Act, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 (Nov. 28, 2012), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_iss
ue_brief_2012_nov_1647_buettgens_small_firm_self_insurance_under_aca_ib.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4FC-FX67] (arguing that regulation of stop-loss insurance will reduce adverse 
selection in the small group market). But see Allison K. Hoffman, An Optimist’s Take on the 
Decline of Small-Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 113 (2013) (arguing that the 
U.S. health insurance system might be better off without the small group market after the ACA). 
04 - Cogan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2018  5:27 PM 
2018] ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE 1125 
 
group health insurance does not deliver insureds a better deal than 
coverage available in the individual health insurance market, there is 
little reason to save the small group market from further decline and 
dissolution.10 
In order to proceed with this inquiry, it is important to first understand 
what “a better deal than individual coverage” means in relation to the 
small group market. To do so, the benefits of group insurance that make 
it more desirable than individual insurance must be identified. Although 
modern scholars have laid out an extensive catalog of the benefits of 
group health insurance, no consensus exists as to the core benefits that 
make group health insurance a better deal than individual coverage.11 To 
identify the core benefits of group coverage, this Article turns to the 
birthplace of group insurance—the life insurance industry just after the 
turn of the last century. When first offered about a century ago, the 
group insurance model revolutionized life insurance by providing three 
benefits: (1) a reduced risk of adverse selection, (2) lower administrative 
expenses, and (3) expanded access to coverage. A fourth benefit, a 
federal tax advantage, also lowered the cost of group coverage. 
Together, these four core benefits made group insurance a better deal 
                                                     
10. Throughout this Article, I refer to the dissolution or death of the small group market. This can 
mean one of two future states of the market. The first is a death spiral, a circular pattern in which 
low-risk insureds leave the market, thereby driving up prices, which prompts more low-risk to 
leave, driving up prices even more. This cycle continues until the risk pool collapses and no one 
remains covered. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224 (2004) (explaining how adverse selection can lead to a death 
spiral). A second possibility is that the small group market continues to decline but eventually 
stabilizes, albeit with low enrollment and high costs. This would leave the small group market 
functioning, but dwarfed by the individual and large group markets. 
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 244–46 (2d ed. 2014) (identifying 
benefits of group coverage: healthier risk pool, tax subsidies, lower administrative costs, and 
employers as beneficial agents for employees); Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-
Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 
893–902 (2011) (discussing how employer-based group coverage provides favorable tax treatment, 
lower costs, beneficial agency relationships between the employer and its employees, and labor 
incentives); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 30–35 (2001) (finding that group insurance offers 
employers as beneficial agents, solutions to bounded rationality problems, valuable administrative 
services, efficiencies of scale with regard to costs, a tax subsidy that binds a heterogeneous risk 
pool, and reduced adverse selection, among others); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health 
Insurance: A Balance Sheet, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 124, 125–26 (discussing how 
employer-based group coverage effectively pools health insurance risks, provides a tax benefit, 
offers opportunity for innovation in the purchase of health care, and reflects consumer preferences). 
Group health coverage has also been subject to criticism. See, e.g., Hyman & Hall, supra, at 27–30 
(discussing “informational, preference, and incentive mismatches—between employers and 
employees, and between employee groups and individual employees—that play out in the cost and 
breadth of [group] coverage”). 
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than individual insurance by lowering the cost of life insurance and 
making it available to those who would have been denied coverage in 
the individual market.12 
Using these four benefits as a framework to evaluate small group 
health insurance, this Article draws two conclusions about the small 
group market. First, small employers have always been an awkward fit 
in the group insurance market. Due to their size and the actuarial limits 
of experience rating, small groups cannot be priced or administered the 
same way as large groups. As a result, the small group market has 
always been (and continues to be) exposed to adverse selection, very 
much like the individual insurance market.13 
Second, the post-ACA small group market largely fails to deliver 
group benefits to its insureds, in part because of its adverse selection 
problems and in part because the ACA brought a number of 
improvements to the individual market. While the small group market 
was thought to provide worthwhile benefits over the individual market 
prior to the ACA (i.e., greater access to coverage, a tax subsidy not 
available to purchasers in the individual market, and lower 
administrative costs),14 the post-ACA small group market: (1) provides 
no greater protection from adverse selection than the individual market, 
(2) fails to deliver insurance at a lower administrative cost than the 
individual market, and (3) does not offer any greater access to coverage 
than the individual market. As for the fourth benefit, the tax subsidy, the 
results are mixed. Insureds in the small group market with higher 
incomes enjoy a tax subsidy that is not available to them in the 
individual market. Conversely, lower- and middle-income individuals 
get a better tax subsidy in the individual market.15 
As a result of these findings, there appears to be little reason to prop 
up the small group market. Allowing the small group market to continue 
its decline would likely push millions to the individual market.16 This 
                                                     
12. See infra sections I.A–B. 
13. See infra section II.B. 
14. See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1944 (noting that prior to the ACA, “the 
individual market for health insurance . . . has historically been even less attractive than the small-
group market” due to the lack of a tax benefit and significant adverse selection). 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. Although the individual market is the natural landing spot for many leaving the small group 
market, it is unlikely that everyone shifting out of that market will transition to the individual 
market. Some small employers currently in the small group market will self-insure as the small 
group market declines. Member of some households will shift to a large group plan through a 
spouse or other family member. Other may avail themselves of other types of coverage, such as 
short-term coverage. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. Some will remain uninsured. 
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would help reduce the fragmentation that has long beset our private 
health insurance markets. It would also make the individual health 
insurance market larger and more stable. Of course, not everyone would 
win if the small group market were allowed to die off. The biggest losers 
would be the high earners in the small group market who will lose their 
premium tax subsidy. But it makes little sense to maintain an entire 
insurance market to retain a tax benefit for only some insureds.17 If 
Congress wanted to maintain this tax break after the collapse of the 
small group market, it could, for example, allow small employers to 
reimburse their high-income employees for premiums paid in the 
individual market with pre-tax wages. Indeed, prior to the ACA, small 
employers could reimburse their employees with pre-tax dollars for 
premiums they paid for individual market coverage and can still do so to 
a limited extent.18 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the origins of 
group coverage in the life insurance market, explains the advantages of 
group coverage over individual insurance, and sets out the framework 
that is used in Part III to evaluate the benefits of the small group market. 
Part I also describes three aspects of the group insurance model that have 
negatively affected the functionality of the small group market: 
experience rating, group size limits, and market competition. Next, 
Part II shifts to the development of group health insurance, its expansion 
into small group coverage, and the detrimental effect of experience 
rating and market competition on the small group market. Part III, the 
heart of this Article, applies the core benefits identified in Part I to the 
post-ACA small group market. Drawing on the analysis in Part II and 
recent data, this Article demonstrates that the post-ACA small group 
market offers no advantages over the individual market with respect to 
adverse selection, access to coverage, or administrative costs. For those 
with low or moderate incomes, below 400% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL), the individual market offers a better tax subsidy. For those above 
400% FPL, the small group market offers a better subsidy. Finally, 
Part IV considers some additional questions about the small group 
market. Does small group coverage provide consumer or employer 
                                                     
17. To be sure, the tax inequities of our health insurance system are longstanding and they have 
long favored the wealthy. See STAN DORN, URBAN INST., CAPPING THE TAX EXCLUSION OF 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: IS EQUITY FEASIBLE? 1 (2009), 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411894_cappingthetaxexclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL9B-
ZHMR] (noting that the group insurance tax exclusion provides the most benefit “to the affluent, 
who pay the highest marginal tax rates and who tend to receive the most generous health benefits”). 
18. See infra notes 302–303, and accompanying text. 
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benefits that weigh in favor of preserving the market? Fixes have been 
suggested for the small group market. If these fixes are implemented, 
will the small group market deliver group benefits? Finally, who will be 
the winners and losers if the small group market dies? 
I. LIFE INSURANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF GROUP 
COVERAGE 
This Part describes the development of group insurance as it first 
emerged in the life insurance industry, thereby laying the foundation for 
the analysis of the small group health insurance market in Part III. 
Section I.A describes the individual insurance market just prior to the 
advent of group life insurance. Adverse selection and high 
administrative costs were core problems in the individual life insurance 
market. These problems paved the way for group coverage. Next, 
section I.B describes the advent of group insurance and identifies the 
four core benefits that made group insurance an attractive alternative to 
individual insurance. Section I.C closes by explaining the legacy of three 
aspects of the group model for small group coverage: experience rating, 
group size, and competition. 
A. Individual Life Insurance, Adverse Selection, and High 
Administrative Costs 
Individual life insurance had been available for more than one 
hundred years before the group insurance model emerged.19 Although 
largely scorned by the public for decades,20 life insurance had developed 
into a desirable commodity by the mid-1800s.21 No longer viewed as 
gambling for “dirty money” or the immoral pricing of human life,22 life 
                                                     
19. See Viviana A. Zelizer, Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death 
in 19th-Century America, 84 AM. J. SOC. 591, 595 (1978) (noting that life insurance was first sold 
in the U.S. in the late eighteenth century). 
20. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017) [hereinafter ZELIZER, MORALS] (noting that early on, 
life insurance had been considered “‘detrimental’ to the interests of the country”). 
21. Shifts in economic conditions and cultural values in the nineteenth century made life 
insurance a desirable commodity. Urbanization in the nineteenth century coupled with family 
reliance on wage income created financial insecurity for widows and orphans. Id. at 12–13. In the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, inherited land often provided widows and orphans 
sufficient resources for support. Id. at 62. Urbanization changed this, making families almost 
exclusively dependent on the husband/father’s wage. With little capital beyond his income and no 
property to pass on to the family, the premature death of an urban breadwinner “spelled economic 
disaster to his widow and orphans.” Id. at 66. 
22. By the mid-1800s, the growing awareness of the connection between death and economic loss 
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insurance was regarded as a responsible way for urban breadwinners to 
provide for their families after death.23 To some, the purchase of life 
insurance was even viewed as a moral obligation.24 
But life insurance was not available to everyone. Individual coverage 
was expensive and exclusive; many applicants could not meet the price25 
or the stringent application and medical examination requirements26 and 
were excluded from coverage. These barriers were largely the result of 
two factors: insurer fears of adverse selection and the high costs of 
marketing and administering individual insurance policies. In turn, these 
barriers imposed financial and social costs on families unable to access 
coverage. 
1. Barriers to Individual Coverage 
a. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is an information problem; it occurs when buyers of 
insurance know more about their own risk of making a claim than the 
insurance company.27 If buyers use their own private risk information 
when purchasing or forgoing insurance, an insurer can lose money.28 A 
simple example illustrates how adverse selection works. Imagine two 
                                                     
made the public more receptive to insurers’ discourse linking life insurance to a “good death.” Id. at 
50, 60–64. Life insurance was seen as a form of risk management and a moral means to economic 
security of the family. Id. at 66. See also SOLOMON S. HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 12 (1921) 
(“Failure of the head of a family to insure his life . . . amounts to gambling with the greatest of all 
chances, and the gamble is a particularly mean one since . . . the dependent family and not the 
gambler must suffer the consequences.”). 
23. See ZELIZER, MORALS, supra note 20, at 66. 
24. BURTON JESSE HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE 262 (1907) (“He who has 
dependents and no income except the product of his own toil is as morally bound to carry life 
insurance as he is to furnish his children food and shelter.”).  
25. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 250, WELFARE WORK 
FOR EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1919) (noting that 
individual life insurance was too expensive for most workers); P. H. McCormack, Group Insurance, 
51 J. INST. ACTUARIES 313, 314 (1919) (“Ordinary life insurance . . . is of course beyond the means 
of the majority of wage-earners . . . .”). 
26. See Henry C. Lippincott, The Essentials of Life Insurance Administration, 26 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 192, 200 (1905) (“In dealing with life insurance men act selfishly . . . if the 
medical examiner did not stand at the entrance gate, the weakest and least desirable lives would be 
surest and soonest to come in.”); John M. Holcombe, Life Insurance in the United States, 150 N. 
AM. REV. 401, 402 (1890) (“[I]t has been found necessary . . . to admit only those who shall be 
found by physical examination and personal and family record to possess in the highest degree the 
elements of longevity.”).  
27. See Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1223. 
28. See id. at 1224.  
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types of people, a sick person who is likely to die soon and a healthy 
person who is unlikely to die soon. Both are considering buying life 
insurance. The insurer, however, is handicapped by an information 
disadvantage: it does not know the health status of its applicants. If the 
insurer sets its premiums based on the population’s average risk of 
death, the sick person, with a high risk of death, will find the coverage to 
be a good deal and will buy the insurance. On the other hand, the healthy 
person, with a low risk of death, will find the same policy too expensive 
and will not buy the insurance. If this scenario plays out on a larger 
scale—too many sick people buy insurance and too many healthy people 
forgo it—the insurer’s claims costs will be higher than expected. The 
premium collected will not cover claims costs and the insurer will lose 
money.29 
Fear of adverse selection drove life insurers to collect and evaluate 
personal information about their applicants. They used a process called 
underwriting to screen out high-risk applicants.30 Only those who passed 
a selective application process and medical examination were offered 
coverage.31 In addition to screening out high-risk applicants, insurers 
also used sales agents to aggressively bring low-risk applicants into the 
insurance pool.32 As Burton J. Hendrick noted in 1907 in The Story of 
Life Insurance, there is “a powerful actuarial justification” for hiring 
agents: 
Experience has demonstrated that men do not insure of their 
own free will. They must be clubbed into it . . . . Properly 
regulated, [the agent system] brings only healthy lives into the 
company. A man anticipating early death does not need to be 
persuaded; he is only too glad to obtain a policy. That is the 
class which voluntarily seeks insurance.33 
                                                     
29. See id. at 1223–24.  
30. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y 
& L. 287, 295 (1993); id. at 294–95 (noting that life insurers developed underwriting as a process 
“to find ‘the best and most desirable insureds’”); see also EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. 
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 133 (11th ed. 2014) (noting that 
underwriting “is an essential element in the operation of any insurance program” and that unless the 
insurer “selects from among its applicants” adverse selection will be “inevitable”). 
31. See Holcombe, supra note 26, at 402. 
32. See ZELIZER, MORALS, supra note 20, at 136–43 (describing the indispensability of direct 
person-to-person sales by agents of the life insurance industry); id. at 137 (noting that by 1905 the 
leading life insurance companies each employed 10,000 to 15,000 agents and subagents). 
33. See HENDRICK, supra note 24, at 262–63. 
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b. Administrative Costs 
Efforts to reduce adverse selection, however, came at considerable 
expense. The costs of individual underwriting (screening every applicant 
and engaging physicians to conduct medical examinations) and paying 
thousands of agents to sell individual coverage were significant. When 
added to the costs of managing thousands of individual life insurance 
policies, an insurer’s administrative costs could consume a sizable 
percentage of the premium, in some cases as high as 80% of the first 
year’s premium.34 
2. The Social and Financial Costs of Underwriting 
Certainly, underwriting benefitted the insurance companies and the 
applicants who bought insurance. Insurers covered a less risky and more 
predictable pool of insureds. This reduced insurers’ financial risk, 
allowing them to charge lower premiums, and made them more 
competitive. For insurer and insured, this was a win-win situation. But 
there was also a tradeoff. Those denied coverage lacked the financial 
protection of insurance. As Tom Baker has argued, such denials imposed 
social and financial consequences. Insurance not only preserves social 
status through risk sharing but also assigns status when limiting access 
through underwriting: 
[T]he children of a parent refused life . . . insurance maintain[ed] 
a more tenuous grasp on their [social] position as a result of the 
insurers having classified their parent as a high risk. Should the 
parent die . . . there [would] be no insurance payment to offset 
the loss of the parent’s income.35 
Group insurance provided at least a partial solution to this tradeoff. 
The group insurance model not only lowered costs and reduced adverse 
selection, it also increased access to the financial protections of life 
insurance. 
B. Group Life Insurance 
The first group life insurance policy, sold in 1911 by the Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of New York (Equitable), covered 121 
                                                     
34. See HUEBNER, supra note 22, at 209–12 (describing the administrative charges of individual 
life insurance); id. at 210 (noting that one actuary’s review of life insurance company records found 
that administrative expenses took up 80% of the first year’s premium). 
35. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 
9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003). 
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employees of the Pantasote Leather Co.36 In the months following the 
Pantasote contract, Equitable issued several more group polices, 
including a large policy providing nearly $6 million in coverage for 
nearly three thousand employees of the retailer Montgomery Ward and 
Co.37 Other insurers quickly recognized group life insurance as “a 
tremendous business opportunity”38 and energetically entered the group 
insurance market.39 By the end of 1930—less than two decades after the 
Pantasote policy was issued—life insurers provided nearly $10 billion of 
group life insurance on 6.5 million employees.40 Today, employer-based 
group life insurance covers nearly three quarters of full-time employees 
in the United States.41 
Group insurance made its mark with a simple change to insurance 
practice: it shifted the focus of underwriting from the individual to the 
group.42 This change produced three advantages over individual 
insurance: (1) reduced risk of adverse selection, (2) lowered 
administrative expenses, and (3) greater access to coverage.43 
Additionally, federal tax laws produced a fourth benefit: employer 
expenditures for group life insurance were deductible expenses for the 
employer and were not considered taxable income of employees. 
1. Reduced Risk of Adverse Selection 
Group insurance minimized the risk of adverse selection two ways. 
First, the risk pool—the group of insured individuals—was formed 
independent of a demand for insurance. In the individual life insurance 
                                                     
36. See Michael Bucci, Growth of Employer-Sponsored Group Life Insurance, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Oct. 1991, at 25, 25. 
37. Montgomery Ward approached Equitable as early as 1910 seeking a group policy, the policy 
was not issued until 1912. See C. Manton Eddy, Development and Significance of Group Life 
Insurance, in GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 45, 46 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 
1965). The policy was issued along with a disability income contract, issued by the London 
Guarantee and Accident Company. See A Large Life and Casualty Line, 38 INDICATOR 149, 149 
(1912). 
38. See Bucci, supra note 36, at 27. 
39. See id. 
40. William J. Graham, Group Insurance, 161 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40, 41 (1932). 
41. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2017, Bull. No. 2787, tbl.16 (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ebbl0061.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU92-GPXR] (noting 
73% of full-time civilian workers participate in employer-sponsored life insurance). 
42. See McCormack, supra note 25, at 314–15 (“The distinctive feature of group insurance is that 
the unit of insurance is not the single life but a group of lives.”). 
43. See supra section I.B. 
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market, applicants joined the risk pool precisely because they wanted to 
buy insurance. This raised the risk (and insurer fears) of adverse 
selection. Conversely, in employer-based group coverage, only 
employees entered the risk pool. Since employees came to the group for 
a reason other than to buy insurance (i.e., to get a job), the group was 
unlikely to be disproportionality populated with high-risk individuals 
seeking insurance.44 While the group model reduced the risk of adverse 
selection, it did not eliminate it; there was still a risk of adverse selection 
from within the group of potential insureds. The group likely included 
some high-risk individuals. If only those high-risk employees sought 
insurance through the group, adverse selection would be a problem. 
Insurers controlled this adverse selection risk by imposing a minimum 
participation requirement. This meant that a minimum percentage of the 
group of employees had to participate in the life insurance plan.45 
Together, the employer-based group model and the minimum 
participation requirement substantially reduced the possibility of adverse 
selection compared to individual coverage. This eliminated the need for 
individual underwriting in group coverage. 
2. Lower Administrative Costs 
The second benefit of group insurance was lower administrative costs. 
Group coverage reduced the per-life cost of coverage compared to 
individual insurance. Marketing costs were reduced because sales efforts 
were directed toward a small number of large employers rather than 
thousands and thousands of individuals. Because rates were determined 
on a group basis, the costs of individual underwriting were eliminated.46 
A single contract was issued to the group, reducing the insurer’s clerical 
                                                     
44. See DUNCAN M. MACINTYRE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AND RATE MAKING 4 (1962) 
(noting that adverse selection is reduced because employer groups are organized for a reason other 
than obtaining insurance); Note, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36 
COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1936) (“The danger that sub-standard risks will band together for the 
sole purpose of insurance can be avoided only by a limitation to groups organized for a bona fide 
purpose.”). 
45. An insurance industry standard was first proposed in 1917. The standard required 100% 
participation of employees if the employer paid the entire premium and a minimum participation of 
75% if employees contributed to coverage. By 1917 a committee of the National Convention of 
Insurance Commissioners in collaboration with a committee of actuaries representing the insurance 
companies recommended a minimum participation rate of 75% of employees. See Sterling Pierson, 
The Legislatures Expand the Group Insurance Field, 15 A.B.A. J. 407, 409 (1929) (quoting 
PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 27–29 (1918)). 
46. Frank W. Hanft, Group Life Insurance: Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 90 
(1935) (“[T]he cheapness of group insurance is supposed to spring from economies produced by the 
nature of the device, such as the elimination of medical examinations . . . .”). 
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expenses. In addition, many administrative costs were shifted to the 
employer, including record keeping and premium collection.47 This 
meant that coverage could be written in the employment-based market at 
a considerably lower cost than would be the case if each member of the 
pool were individually insured. These savings could be passed on in the 
form of lower premiums. 
3. Increased Access to Coverage 
Group coverage made life insurance more accessible by eliminating 
the restrictive underwriting practices of individual insurance, which in 
turn expanded insurance benefits to most members of society, including 
many previously thought to be uninsurable.48 This access, however, 
required membership in a group, typically a group of employees. Thus, 
while group coverage increased access to life insurance, it did so only 
for those who could work. Group coverage opened no new doors for 
those unable to work (e.g., the elderly or the very sick) or those who 
could not find work. 
4. The Tax Advantage of Group Insurance 
Favorable treatment under federal tax laws was a major advantage of 
group insurance. Employers could deduct group life insurance premiums 
as ordinary and necessary business expenses when calculating their 
taxable income.49 Moreover, premiums paid by employers for group life 
insurance were not considered taxable employee income.50 
C. The Legacy of the Group Insurance Model 
The group insurance model was generally well-received51 and, as 
described in Part II, later became the dominant method for delivering 
                                                     
47. See EARL T. CRAWFORD & SAMUEL P. HARLAN, THE LAW OF GROUP INSURANCE 4–5 (1936); 
Davis W. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of the Group Technique, in GROUP INSURANCE 
HANDBOOK 31, 41–42 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965). 
48. See Gregg, supra note 47, at 43; McCormack, supra note 25, at 314 (noting that one of the 
objects of group insurance was to enable “many grades of wage-earners, who could not otherwise 
be adequately insured, to obtain the benefit of substantial life insurance protection, at least during 
the period of their employment”). 
49. O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88, 89–90 (1920).  
50. Id. In 1964 the law changed, limiting employees to $50,000 in tax-exempt employer-provided 
life insurance coverage. See William W. Keefer, Forms of Group Permanent Life Insurance, in 
GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 128, 134–35 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965).  
51. Although the group insurance model spread rapidly, it did draw early criticism. Detractors 
complained that group insurance was paternalistic. See CRAWFORD & HARLAN, supra note 47, at 6. 
 
04 - Cogan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2018  5:27 PM 
2018] ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE 1135 
 
health insurance in the United States. But there are two features of group 
insurance, experience rating and group size, as well as a third issue 
related to insurer competition in the presence of adverse selection, that 
are worth additional discussion. These features played a role in shaping 
the group insurance market and contributed to problems when group 
coverage was extended to small firms. 
1. Experience Rating 
Experience rating is the principal method for calculating premiums 
under the group model. Under experience rating, each group pays a 
premium based on its own claims costs.52 Initially, the group insurance 
model did not rely on experience rating; group life policies were priced 
using standard actuarial tables.53 By the 1920s, life insurers had 
embraced experience rating for their group business.54 
To the insurance industry, experience rating was the hallmark of 
insurance equity and fairness—each group pays for its own risk.55 But 
the “experience-rating-as-fairness” narrative does not fully square with 
the historical origins of experience rating. First used the 1890s,56 
experience rates (then called “special rates”) were developed by 
employers’ liability insurers as a means to compete in a market 
dominated by intense price competition.57 But in the liability insurance 
                                                     
Some complained that coverage was gratuitous gift, like a bonus or a holiday turkey, meant to bribe 
workers or prevent them from leaving. They also noted the possibility of impaired job mobility if 
the insurance coverage was particularly valuable to the employee or his family, and that coverage 
was linked to the interests and finances of the employer. Note, supra note 44, at 91–92. 
52. See J.F. Follmann, Jr., Experience Rating vs. Community Rating, 29 J. INS. 403, 403 (1962) 
(“Experience rating is based on the traditional insurance concept of basing a premium for a group of 
individuals on the probability of loss among that group.”). 
53. Group life policies initially priced groups using standard actuarial tables, much like individual 
life insurance. See Insurance Commissioners’ National Convention, 81 STANDARD 213, 219 (1917) 
(noting discussion by actuary H. Pierson Hammond discussing group life rates and noting that rates 
were initially based on standard life expectancy rates but shifted to the experience of the insured 
groups). 
54. While it is not clear exactly when life insurers adopted experience rating, it may have 
appeared as early as 1919. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 45–46 (noting that experience rating 
may have begun as early as 1919, but was authorized by statute in New York by 1926). 
55. See id. at 28.  
56. See id. at 39 (noting that “special rates” in employers’ liability insurance date back to 1896 or 
earlier). 
57. See id. at 37. At the time, price completion was a significant problem in the insurance 
industry. Employer liability rates were based on classification—high for firms in risky industries, 
low for firms in safer industries. As the market for employers’ liability insurance grew, more 
insurers entered the market. Intense competition drove rates too low, resulting in insurer losses. In 
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setting, experience rating was also thought to have salutary effects as 
means to encourage loss prevention. An employer with a safe 
workplace—and fewer than average liability claims—would be 
rewarded with lower premiums. Thus, experience rating also became a 
means of loss prevention.58 The prospect of lower premiums provided an 
incentive to reduce liability risks. 
In life and health insurance markets, however, loss prevention had 
only limited relevance.59 Life and health claims costs were (and continue 
to be) largely tied to the identities of the employees. Employer groups 
with older and sicker workers will produce more claims than employer 
groups with younger and healthier workers, thereby raising premiums.60 
Competition was the main driver behind the use of experience rating in 
these markets61 and the identities of the employer group (i.e., their health 
risk) were the focus of the competition. 
2. Group Size 
Initially, insurers in the group life market had little concern over 
group size. The earliest group life plans covered hundreds or thousands 
of workers.62 There was, however, a need to determine an acceptable 
minimum group size.63 Experience rating only works if a group’s claims 
experience is a reliable predictor of the group’s future claims. This is 
                                                     
response, insurers began to set rates collectively through a rating bureau. But this only worked for a 
short period of time, as pricing pressures continued from insurers operating outside the rating 
bureau. In response, the bureau insurers were allowed to set “special” (i.e., lower) rates for some 
customers based on the firms’ claims and payroll. See id. at 37. Within a few years, insurer 
competition and the use of “special rates” had “wrecked” bureau rates. See id. at 38. The term 
“experience rating” was first used in 1913 to describe a similar rating scenario in workmen’s 
compensation insurance. See id. at 39. In his classic text on health insurance rate making, Duncan 
MacIntyre noted, “it could be argued that the theory of insurance equity was developed because of 
competition, or to rationalize inequitable practices adopted because of competition . . . .” See id. at 
30–31 n.34. 
58. See id. at 39. Liability insurance is still thought to function as a form of nongovernmental 
safety regulation. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012) (arguing that insurance can replace or 
augment government safety regulation). 
59. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 43.  
60. See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563, 607 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 
2000) (“Whom one pools with in health insurance dramatically affects what one has to pay.”). 
61. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 48–49.  
62. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  
63. See Gregg, supra note 47, at 35 (“Any theoretical exactness in determining a safe minimum 
number is not possible. In any case, it should be recognized that no magic number inheres in the 
number selected as the minimum, such as ten or twenty-five.”). 
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due to the law of large numbers, a probability principle used in the 
insurance industry to predict the future claims for a given pool of 
insureds. The larger the pool of insureds, the more accurately future 
claims can be predicted.64 For smaller groups, claims experience is much 
less predictive. Their claims history is simply not large enough for the 
law of large numbers, thus “there is no actuarially valid means of 
experience rating small firms.”65 Yet, there was little consensus on the 
minimum acceptable number of employees for group coverage. The 
number drifted downward from 100 to 50,66 and later to 3 employees,67 
driven by competitive, rather than actuarial, considerations.68 As 
discussed in section II.B, insurers, unable to experience rate small 
groups, instead pooled small firms together to create a large enough 
number of employees to develop sound rates. The pooling of small 
firms, however, created two problems for small group coverage. First, 
the pooling of small group risk provided an opportunity for adverse 
selection by small employers. Second, it opened the door for “cream-
skimming” by insurers, “a kind of ‘reverse adverse selection’” in which 
insurers “rig” a policy’s incentives to attract healthy/low risk customers 
and discourage unhealthy/high risk customers.69 
                                                     
64. This is due to the principle referred to as the law of large numbers. If an insurer provides 
coverage for a sufficiently large pool of insureds, the aggregate claims of the group will equal the 
expected loss of any individual insured in the pool multiplied by the number of insureds in the pool. 
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540 
(1987) (citations omitted); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 30, at 36–40.  
65. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory 
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 569 (1998). 
66. Early legislation of group insurance required no less than 100 lives. See Pierson, supra note 
45, at 408. By 1918, the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners adopted a model 
definition of group insurance that limited group coverage to no less than fifty employees. Hanft, 
supra note 46, at 70, 70 n.1. They believed that at least fifty lives were necessary to support sound 
group underwriting. See Graham, supra note 40, at 31. But there is no firm actuarial number for 
defining the lower limit of group size for the group model. Thus, the fifty-employee limit was not 
universally accepted. Michigan and some other states adopted a standard requiring only twenty-five 
lives in 1925. Pierson, supra note 45, at 409–10. By the late 1920s, only a quarter of states had 
defined group coverage. Most allowed, but did not legislate group coverage, thereby leaving the 
question of minimum group size up to each insurer. See Edwin E. Witte, Group Insurance, 27 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 108, 109 (1928). 
67. See Donald D. Cody, Underwriting Group Medical Expense Coverage, in GROUP INSURANCE 
HANDBOOK 354, 368 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965). 
68. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
69. Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1253. See also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public 
Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private 
Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 458 (2001) (cream skimming involves “picking off the better 
risks and discouraging high-risk insureds”). Cream skimming simply shifts risks (and higher costs) 
“rather than providing a benefit to society.” Id. at 481. 
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3. Competition and Asymmetric Information 
While competition is generally thought to produce the best market 
outcome, including the lowest prices and the best allocation of 
resources,70 this assumption does not necessarily apply in insurance 
markets. Asymmetric information can cause a competitive insurance 
market to operate inefficiently or even fail.71 Michael Rothschild and 
Joseph Stiglitz illustrated this possibility in their classic analysis of 
asymmetric information in a competitive insurance market.72 
The Rothschild-Stiglitz model was not intended to represent an actual 
insurance market.73 Instead, it presents a model that shows how the 
presence of asymmetric information can undercut traditional 
assumptions about the value of competition in an insurance market.74 
The model contemplates two types of insurance buyers, high-risk buyers 
(i.e., those more likely to make a claim) and low-risk buyers (i.e., those 
less likely to make a claim). The model also assumes information 
asymmetry; each customer knows his or her own risk, but insurance 
companies do not know the risk of individual customers.75 
Rothschild and Stiglitz note that only two kinds of equilibria are 
possible.76 The first is a pooling equilibrium, in which high- and low-risk 
buyers purchase the same policy.77 Their claims costs are pooled 
                                                     
70. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (arguing that competition produces “the 
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest 
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of 
our democratic political and social institutions”). 
71. See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1240 (noting that economists are “fascinated by 
adverse selection . . . because it can overturn one of the central tenets of economic theory—that 
perfectly competitive markets are efficient”); David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health 
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J. ECON. 433, 434–36 
(1998) (noting that competition in insurance markets “is somewhat problematic” due to adverse 
selection problems); Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at 607 (noting that health insurance 
“fundamentally different from other markets in ways that create harmful effects from competition”). 
72. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). For a more detailed, but 
accessible explanation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, see Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1235–40.  
73. Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 72, at 648.  
74. Id. at 629 (“We are able to show that not only may a competitive equilibrium not exist, but 
when equilibria do exist, they may have strange properties.”). 
75. Id. at 632. 
76. Id. at 634. Equilibrium means that when consumers choose the best policy for them (they 
“maximize expected utility”), insurers have no incentive to stop offering or change the policies they 
currently offer. Id. at 633 (“[N]o contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected 
profits . . . [and] no contract outside the equilibrium set . . . will make a nonnegative profit.”). 
77. Id. at 634. 
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together, resulting in a premium based on the average cost of the high- 
and low-risk buyers. The second is a separating equilibrium in which the 
two types of buyers purchase separate policies and their claims costs are 
segregated in separate pools.78 Each pool pays a premium based on its 
own risk; the low-risk buyers pay a lower premium and the high-risk 
buyers pay a higher premium. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz first point out that a pooling equilibrium 
cannot exist in a competitive market.79 In the pooled policy, the low-risk 
buyers pay a premium based on the average costs of the pool of high- 
and low-risk buyers. This means that the less expensive low-risk buyers 
subsidize the high-risk buyers. A competing insurer can exploit the low-
risk buyers’ private knowledge of their own risk for its own competitive 
advantage. It could offer the low-risk buyers a better deal and peel them 
away from the pooled policy. Rothschild and Stiglitz suggest this could 
be done by offering a policy with less coverage and lower premiums. 
This new policy would attract only the low-risk buyers because the high-
risk buyers would prefer to stay fully insured. This would destroy a 
pooling equilibrium.80 
Next, Rothschild and Stiglitz point out that insurers in a competing 
market could offer the high-risk buyers and low-risk buyers different 
policies, each of which are designed to attract only one type of customer 
(high-risk or low-risk).81 The result would be either a separating 
equilibrium or no equilibrium.82 Under this scenario, insurers offer two 
types of policies, one with full coverage and full cost and one with less 
coverage and a lower cost. The lower-cost policy will be attractive to the 
low-risk buyers because of the lower price. It will also be unattractive to 
the high-risk buyers because they prefer more coverage. Conversely, the 
high-cost policy will be attractive only to the high-risk buyers, because 
they desire full coverage, and unattractive to the low-risk buyers because 
of price. This will produce a separating equilibrium because each 
customer will prefer their own policy. But this does not make everyone 
better off. Yes, the low-risk buyers save money by paying a lower 
premium, but there is a trade-off. The low-risk buyers sacrifice coverage 
to save money. The high-risk buyers are also no better off since they 
remain in the full coverage pool and pay a higher premium.83 
                                                     
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 635. 
81. Id. at 635–36. 
82. Id. at 636. 
83. Id. 
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Rothschild and Stiglitz also note the possibility that a separating 
equilibrium will not exist at all. If the high-risk buyers are only a small 
part of the population, a policy can be designed so that it will attract 
high- and low-risk buyers.84 The premium generated by the average 
claims cost of the pool will not be so high as to drive off the low-risk 
buyers. But this position will not last. In a competitive market, a 
competing insurer will offer a slightly less costly policy that will be 
more attractive to low-risk buyers. The pooled policy will fail as the 
low-risk buyers defect. If the high-risk buyers try to re-pool with the 
low-risk customers, the process could replay over and over again, 
precluding equilibrium.85 Such a market “might oscillate wildly, or 
collapse entirely.”86 
D. Coda 
Once introduced, the group life insurance model was quite successful 
because it helped solve three significant problems of the individual life 
insurance market: adverse selection, high costs, and limited access. 
Group coverage also offered a price discount that was unavailable in the 
individual market: a tax-subsidized premium. But the group model was 
not without significant limits. First, experience rating, the means of 
pricing group coverage, can aid loss prevention in some lines of 
insurance but not in life or health insurance. Instead, it could be used as 
a competitive tool to segregate risk. Second, the success of the group 
model is tied to the size of the employer. Small employers have too few 
employees to develop rates based on their own claims experience. The 
pooling of small employers for sound rates opens the door for adverse 
selection by insureds and cream skimming by insurers. Finally, the 
normal assumptions about the benefits of competition do not necessarily 
apply in an insurance market. Rothschild and Stiglitz demonstrate that 
competition in an insurance market may not be beneficial to either the 
insureds or the market. The next Part of this Article explores how these 
limits shaped the development of group health insurance and its 
expansion to small groups. 
                                                     
84. Id. at 636–37. 
85. Id. 
86. Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1239. 
04 - Cogan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2018  5:27 PM 
2018] ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE 1141 
 
II. GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE SMALL GROUP 
MARKET 
The rapid growth of employer-based group health insurance during 
World War II is often described as “a historical accident” propelled by 
two favorable federal policies: (1) price and wage controls that prompted 
employers to offer health insurance as a wage substitute to attract 
workers and (2) changes to the tax code that exempted employer 
payments for health coverage from income taxes.87 In the decades 
following World War II, employer-based group insurance spread 
rapidly, prompted by aggressive union bargaining for health insurance 
and non-unionized employers offering generous health coverage in an 
attempt to prevent unionization.88 By 1960, employer-based group health 
insurance covered over a hundred million people.89 By 2016, over 157 
million Americans were covered by employer-based group health 
insurance.90 
Typically missing from the standard history of group health insurance 
is the development of small group coverage and the fundamental 
differences between coverage for large and small employers. This Part 
fills those gaps. Section II.A describes how rising costs of medical care 
drove hospitals to develop the Blue Cross model of group coverage, how 
the Blue Cross community-rated model was different from the 
experience rated group insurance model, and why group size was largely 
irrelevant under the Blue Cross model. Section II.A concludes by 
describing how commercial insurers entered the health insurance market 
and, using adverse selection to their advantage, brought an end to the 
Blue Cross model. Turning to small groups, section II.B explains how 
the experience rated model first excluded small groups, but later 
included them by pooling small groups together. While small employers 
realized some of the benefits of group coverage, protection from adverse 
selection was not one of them. The result was an unstable market that 
                                                     
87. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 25; Moore, supra note 11, at 887–92; Melissa A. 
Thomasson, The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1373, 1374 (2003). 
88. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 25–26. 
89. Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development of 
U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 233, 233–34 (2002) (reporting that health 
insurance coverage grew from 12.3 million Americans in 1940 to 122.5 million in 1960). 
90. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe= 
0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D 
[https://perma.cc/4TJP-BKAA]. 
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oscillated severely as health care costs rose in the 1980s and 1990s, 
requiring substantial regulation to prevent its disintegration. 
A. Blue Cross and Early Group Health Insurance 
1. The Need to Finance Medical Care 
Unlike life insurance, health insurance had no meaningful presence 
prior to the twentieth century.91 Simply put, there was no individual 
health insurance market because there was little need for insurance to 
cover medical expenses. Prior to the 1920s, medical care was both 
ineffective and inexpensive. Medical technology was relatively simple, 
the ill were usually treated at home, and hospitals were viewed as 
“places of death.”92 Loss of income due to illness was a far more 
significant problem for workers and their families than the cost of 
medical care.93 Improvements in medical technology, anti-infection 
techniques, and more demanding education and licensure standards for 
physicians improved the quality of and demand for medical care.94 As 
the quality of medical care improved in the early twentieth century, 
however, its costs increased.95 As hospitals grew in both size and 
technical capability, their costs likewise increased—pricing many 
middle-class Americans out of the market for hospital care. By the 
1920s, the cost of medical care exceeded lost earnings due to sickness 
for poor and middle-class families.96 This created financial problems for 
both the sick and the hospitals that served them: the sick could not pay 
the hospitals, and the hospitals were struggling for cash. The Great 
Depression only intensified the financial problems of hospitals. Wealthy 
philanthropists, who had long provided financial support to hospitals, 
                                                     
91. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 294 (1982) 
(“Before the 1930s, the only extensive private health plans offered direct services, usually to 
employees in an industry.”).  
92. See Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235 (noting that “the public had little confidence in the 
efficacy of medical care”). 
93. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 191–92 (2005). Workers could obtain 
some financial protection from the cost of sickness by participating in industrial or fraternal 
sickness funds, which provided sick pay to incapacitated workers. See JOHN E. MURRAY, ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS FUNDS 3–15 (2007); 
Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235 (“[I]nstead of health insurance, ‘sickness’ insurance policies 
designed to protect the insured against loss of income developed, while actual health insurance 
remained relatively unknown.”). 
94. See Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235–36. 
95. See STARR, supra note 91, at 259–60. 
96. See id. at 258–59. 
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substantially reduced their support as their own financial status 
declined.97 Full-paying patients were becoming less common while non-
paying patients were proportionately increasing.98 As a result, more than 
100 hospitals failed in the first years of the Depression,99 and those that 
remained had only about a 50% occupancy rate.100 In absence of 
publicly financed health insurance,101 conditions were ripe for a form of 
medical care financing that appealed to both hospitals and the middle 
class. Yet commercial insurance companies did not offer coverage for 
medical expenses. They feared adverse selection, abusive billing, and the 
high cost of agent commissions.102 
In 1929, the Baylor University Hospital in Dallas, Texas, like many 
other hospitals, was struggling to make ends meet.103 Looking to 
increase its revenues, Baylor came up with a plan: it began to offer local 
employers a prepaid hospitalization plan.104 Baylor had no plans to start 
an insurance plan or generate a national movement; it simply wanted to 
control its bad debt by generating a steady income from potential 
patients.105 The plan was an immediate success. 
2. The Blue Cross Group Model 
The Baylor plan was the first step in what would later become Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield.106 First offered to Dallas public school teachers, 
the Baylor plan guaranteed three weeks of prepaid hospital care in 
                                                     
97. See Fredric R. Hedinger, The Social Role of Blue Cross: Progress and Problems, INQUIRY, 
June 1968, at 4. 
98. See id. 
99. See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. Mar. 1994, at 5. 
100. Id. 
101. For an overview of failed efforts by Progressive reformers to institute a social health 
insurance program in the United States in the early 1900s, see STARR, supra note 91, at 240–70. 
102. Id. at 294. 
103. ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 4 (1997) (explaining that the hospital was behind on its 
bills, overdue by $1.5 million on bond payments, and “just 30 days ahead of the sheriff”).  
104. See id. at 5. 
105. See id. at viii. In the late 1920s and 1930s, hospitals experienced financial troubles due to the 
rising costs of medical care and the economic downturn caused by the Great Depression. See 
STARR, supra note 91, at 295–96. 
106. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 116 (“[T]he Baylor plan was the forerunner of Blue 
Cross.”). Blue Cross and Blue Shield were initially separate organizations, but formally merged in 
1982. Blue Cross covered hospital care and Blue Shield covered physician care. See generally 
CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103 (providing a comprehensive history of the 
development of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans). 
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exchange for a monthly payment of fifty cents.107 As Baylor extended 
this arrangement to various employer groups,108 other Dallas hospitals 
adopted similar plans.109 Hospitals throughout the country soon followed 
suit.110 While each of these initial plans focused on a single hospital, 
hospitals began to band together to form community plans.111 Eventually 
these plans became known as Blue Cross.112 
The Blue Cross model was similar to the group life insurance model 
in some ways. Blue Cross initially channeled coverage primarily through 
large employer groups.113 This meant lower marketing and 
administrative costs just like the group insurance model.114 And, selling 
the plan to employer groups reduced adverse selection.115 But the Blue 
Cross model was also very different from the group insurance model in 
three critical ways.116 First, Blue Cross was not sold on the basis of a 
group’s specific risk—there was no experience rating. Blue Cross had a 
communitarian orientation,117 and its coverage was community rated.118 
This meant that their rates were based on the average claims cost of 
everyone covered by a Blue Cross plan. In other words, there was a 
single risk pool with a single community rate.119 Second, Blue Cross 
plans did not compete with other Blue Cross plans. Each plan was a 
                                                     
107. See ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 10 (1963). 
108. See id. 
109. See STARR, supra note 91, at 295. 
110. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 11. 
111. See id. (observing that hospital prepayment plans began to include local hospitals willing to 
participate in the plan); STARR, supra note 91, at 296 (noting that by 1932, multi-hospital 
prepayment plans were emerging across the country). 
112. The Blue Cross symbol was developed in 1934 by E. A. van Steenwyk, a founder of 
Minnesota’s Blue Cross plan. CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103, at 24. The symbol 
“perpetuated itself as unifying force” among the newly emerging hospitalization plans. Id. at 33. 
113. See id. at 23; MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 126. 
114. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 126 (“[T]he plans were able to secure the economies of 
group enrollment—no physical examinations, lower acquisition costs, [and] employment-centered 
collections.”). 
115. See id.  
116. See id. at 4 n.8 (noting that although it shared many of the characteristics of an insurer, Blue 
Cross was not an insurance company in the legal or technical sense).  
117. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 6–7 (describing the social philosophy of Blue Cross). 
118. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 11–12. The term “community rating” was originally 
devised by advocates for Blue Cross “to function as a philosophical defense and rallying position 
for their rating practices.” Hedinger, supra note 97, at 7.  
119. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 11–12. It should be noted that nearly all insured groups 
are, to some extent, grouped and priced by the risk of increased costs. Even community rated plans 
like Blue Cross differentiated rates based on whether the coverage was for a single subscriber, a 
married couple, or a family with dependents. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 7.  
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local monopoly, covering a distinct geographic area.120 The 
noncompetitive model meant there was no inter-plan competition for 
groups. Thus, there was no cream skimming. In other words, plans had 
no incentive to cut rates to gain a competitive advantage or poach low-
cost groups from other plans. Third, the community rate and 
noncompetitive model made employer group size largely irrelevant. 
Unlike the group insurance model, group size was not significant for 
pricing coverage. Thus, Blue Cross could offer coverage to small 
groups.121 
Although its business was overwhelmingly group-based, Blue Cross 
did offer individual coverage.122 But Blue Cross individual coverage was 
subject to the same adverse selection problems typical of individual 
insurance. As a result, Blue Cross plans adopted standard insurance 
industry practices with respect to their individual coverage: medical 
screening,123 risk-based pricing,124 limited benefits,125 and exclusions126 
based on risk. Adverse selection and high administrative costs led to 
higher premiums for individual insurance than group coverage.127 
3. The End of the Blue Cross Group Model 
The success of Blue Cross convinced commercial insurers that health 
insurance was a viable line. Commercial insurers offered individual 
                                                     
120. See STARR, supra note 91, at 297–98. 
121. See O.D. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 161–62 (1963) (Blue Cross offered coverage to 
firms as small as two employees); MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 135 (coverage offered to firms as 
small as four or five employees). Early on, some Blue Cross plans did suffer adverse selection 
problems due to sales of plans to small employer groups and individuals. See CUNNINGHAM & 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103, at 23 (describing financial troubles experienced by a New York 
Blue Cross plan in the 1930s). Those difficulties, however, were largely attributable to lax 
enrollment standards. Id. Plan administrators simply did not anticipate that open enrollment and 
community rating with lax enrollment oversight would encourage initial enrollment by subscribers 
in need of immediate medical care. See id. at 22–23 (noting that “the Plan’s amateur underwriters 
had not realized that the first people to sign up for hospitalization would probably either know or 
suspect that they had medical problems”).  
122. In the mid-1930s a few Blue Cross plans offered individual coverage. By 1959 nearly all 
Blue Cross plans sold individual coverage. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 132–33. 
123. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 33 (noting that most Blue Cross plans required a medical 
history before coverage was issued). 
124. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 133. 
125. See DICKERSON, supra note 121, at 161; MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 134. 
126. Many Blue Cross plans prohibited enrollment past age sixty or sixty-five. MACINTYRE, 
supra note 44, at 136. 
127. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 308–09. 
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coverage,128 which, like other types of individual insurance, was 
expensive due to adverse selection and high administrative costs.129 
They also entered the group hospitalization market.130 But insurance 
companies did not adopt the Blue Cross, community-rated model. 
Instead, they turned to the life insurance group model,131 a move that 
was disastrous for Blue Cross. Consistent with Rothschild-Stiglitz, 
insurers used the group insurance model to carve-up Blue Cross’s pooled 
equilibrium. Using experience rating, competing insurers were able to 
strip heathy employer groups out of the Blue Cross pool by offering 
them their own rate that was lower than the Blue Cross community 
average.132 As less costly groups defected from Blue Cross plans, its 
community rates—based on the average claims cost of all Blue Cross 
subscribers—went up, allowing commercial insurers to attract even 
more groups on an experience rated basis133 thereby beginning a death 
spiral by adverse selection.134 By 1951, the tide had turned. Whereas 
Blue Cross had dominated the group market since its inception, 
commercial insurers surpassed Blue Cross in coverage and never looked 
                                                     
128. See J. F. Follmann, Jr., Development and Significance of Group Health Insurance, in GROUP 
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 57, 64 tbl.5-2 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965) (setting out 
the percentage of hospitalization coverage written by commercial insurers on an individual and 
group basis from 1940–1963).  
129. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 55–56 (noting loss ratio for individual accident and 
health insurance “sometimes averaging 45–55% or premium or less”). 
130. See id. at 48 (noting that commercial insurers first sold group hospitalization coverage in 1934). 
131. See id. at 37–49 (detailing the development of experience rating and its application in the 
employers’ liability and group life lines). 
132. This is also referred to as cream skimming. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
133. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 15. 
134. A death spiral occurs when “good risks begin to exit [coverage], the average quality of those 
insureds remaining falls and prices rise in a vicious circle, ending . . . [when] no one is covered.” 
Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1224. A death spiral by adverse selection is the general accepted view 
for the collapse of the Blue Cross model of community rating. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, 
REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 40 (1994) [hereinafter HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE] (“Adverse selection forced Blue Cross to abandon community rating in favor 
of experience rating for groups . . . .”). But see Melissa A. Thomasson, Did Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield Suffer from Adverse Selection? Evidence from the 1950s (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9167, 2002), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9167.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5X-
RR26] (questioning the adverse selection narrative based on a finding that Blue Cross subscribers 
did not have higher medical costs than enrollees in the experience rated plans of commercial 
insurers). Thomasson’s conclusion, while interesting, is not entirely convincing. Her findings were 
based on a single year of data (1957), collected long after many Blue Cross plans had switched to 
experience rating for some or most of their group business. Thomasson’s data does not disaggregate 
claims data from Blue Cross’s experience rated business and community rated group plans. Thus, it 
is impossible to tell from Thomasson’s analysis of the group market whether adverse selection 
financially disadvantaged Blue Cross group plans that relied on community rating.  
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back.135 Ultimately, Blue Cross was forced to shift its group business to 
competitive experience rating in order to survive.136 
B. Small Group Health Coverage Emerges 
1. Experience Rating and Small Groups 
The dominance of the group insurance model not only ended Blue 
Cross’s community rating, but also prevented some small firms from 
obtaining group coverage.137 The insurance laws in some states set a 
minimum group size that excluded small groups, and many insurers 
would not offer group business to small employers.138 Experience rating 
relies on groups large enough to produce their own stable claims history. 
Because smaller groups cannot produce that kind of steady claims 
experience, they are ill-suited for experience rating.139 But this barrier 
did not last for long. Driven by “competitive considerations and the 
desire to extend group insurance techniques to a larger share of the 
market,”140 insurers expanded group coverage to smaller employers. 
This was desirable for smaller employers, who could offer group 
coverage and its benefits—no individual underwriting, lower costs, and 
a tax subsidy—to their employees. 
But the expansion of the group model to small groups posed a 
problem: how to accurately establish rates for groups unfit for 
experience rating. Ironically, insurers adopted an approach that 
resembled the Blue Cross system: community rating.141 Insurers pooled 
the claims experience of small employers to develop a basic rate and 
then applied group-specific adjustments based on factors such as age.142 
                                                     
135. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 5. 
136. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 14.  
137. J. F. Follmann, Jr., The Growth of Group Health Insurance, 32 J. RISK & INS. 105, 110 (1965). 
138. Id. 
139. See supra notes 36–37, 63–65 and accompanying text. 
140. See Robert R. Neal, Health Insurance and the Practicing Lawyer, 1962 A.B.A. SEC. INS. 
NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC. 251, 258 (1962); see also Follmann, supra note 137, at 110 (noting that 
statutory restrictions were lowered allowing insurers to offer coverage to smaller groups, some as 
small as two). 
141. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 106–07 (reporting that as the group insurance market 
expanded to include smaller groups, insurers pooled small groups for rating purposes); Follmann, 
supra note 52, at 413 (noting that small groups were pooled into a community and charged a 
community rate). 
142. See Mark A. Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, HEALTH 
AFF. Summer 1992, at 111 [hereinafter Hall, Political Economics of Health Insurance Market 
Reform]. 
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In a sense, the experience rating system was extended to small 
employers but only to a pool of small firms, rather than a pool of 
employees of one firm, as was the case for large firms. There was, 
however, a significant problem with this approach. Unlike employees 
who entered the large employer’s risk pool because they sought 
employment rather than insurance, small groups entered the new small 
group risk pool precisely because they sought insurance. This opened the 
door for adverse selection. As a result, small group coverage lacked the 
adverse selection protection enjoyed by large group coverage. 
2. Small Groups, Cream Skimming, and Blue Cross Redux 
The small group system worked well for a while. But by the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the market for small employer coverage began to 
disintegrate.143 A sharp escalation in the underlying cost of medical care 
drove some insurers to look for a competitive edge as healthier groups 
sought cheaper coverage.144 Insurers engaged in cream skimming, in 
which they structured their policies to attract healthier/lower risk 
customers and discourage less healthy/higher risk customers145—the 
same behavior that contributed to the demise of the community-rated 
Blue Cross group model. This move intensified competition among all 
insurers, leading the industry to abandon its community rating methods 
in favor of greater risk selection. Under this new rating regime, insurers 
either applied experience rating techniques to small groups, which were 
wholly unsuitable and resulted in “highly unstable rating practices,”146 or 
they applied “destructive medical underwriting techniques”147 that 
treated small groups more like applicants in the individual insurance 
market—a market insurers historically approached with trepidation due 
to fears of adverse selection. 
As a result of insurers’ desire to weed out groups with potentially 
costly members, some small groups were turned down while others were 
priced out. Insurers also engaged in other risk selection techniques, such 
as imposing lengthy exclusions for preexisting conditions, applying 
broad coverage exclusions,148 and engaging in post-claims 
                                                     
143. See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685, 687–89 (1999). 
144. See Mark A. Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market for Small Businesses, 326 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 565, 565 (1992) [hereinafter Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market]. 
145. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
146. See Hall, Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, supra note 142. 
147. See id. 
148. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 18. 
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underwriting.149 Some insurers also engaged in “churning,” a practice 
whereby an insurer initially offered a significant discount to a new small 
group based on the group’s initial good health profile.150 At renewal 
time, however, the insurer imposed huge price increases or refused to 
renew altogether, forcing the group to seek coverage from another 
insurer.151 These practices resulted in a highly volatile and disintegrating 
health insurance market for smaller employers.152 This very much 
appeared to be the competitive, no equilibrium market envisioned by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz—a market that oscillated and seemed to be on 
the verge of collapse. 
3. Small Group Health Insurance Is Reformed 
As coverage rates for smaller employers began to plummet, the states 
and the federal government, urged on by the insurance industry itself,153 
stepped in to stabilize coverage for small employers. By 1997, forty-
seven states had enacted small group reform legislation.154 In 1996, the 
federal government passed the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).155 These laws established a formal small 
group market with a dividing line between large and small groups drawn 
at fifty employees.156 The reform laws also included components aimed 
at reducing risk selection by small group insurers.157 For example, small 
group insurers were required to offer coverage on a guaranteed issue and 
                                                     
149. Post claims underwriting, a process by which an insurance company waits until a claim has 
been filed to make underwriting decisions (which should have been made when the application was 
made) to deny coverage, is a particularly pernicious practice, but one that accomplished the twin 
goals of allowing insurers to conduct less stringent (and less costly) upfront evaluations of 
applicants while maintaining the ability to exclude, albeit retrospectively, costly individuals once 
they submitted their claims. Id. at 19. 
150. Id. 
151. See HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 20. 
152. See Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market, supra note 144, at 565. 
153. See id. (noting that insurance industry trade groups proposed extensive regulations to 
stabilize coverage for small groups). 
154. See M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Effect of “Second Generation” Small Group 
Health Insurance Market Reforms, 1993 to 1997, 38 INQUIRY 365, 365 (2001). 
155. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
156. The number fifty was thought best for avoiding defection of employers to the self-insured 
market, where they would be free from state regulation. See HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 54. 
157. See Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation: A Guide to Identifying, 
Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 173, 179 
[hereinafter Hall, Geography]. 
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guaranteed renewal basis. This meant that insurers could not reject a 
small employer that applied for or tried to renew coverage if the 
employer was willing (and able) to pay the premium.158 Most states also 
imposed restrictions on small group rates. The most commonly used was 
rating bands,159 which limited variations in premiums attributable to 
health status and other factors.160 A few states used more restrictive 
adjusted community rating161 and pure community rating 
requirements.162 These regulatory controls constrained the range of 
premiums small firms faced when purchasing group coverage and 
eliminated abusive rating practices by insurers. But the reforms did not 
increase take up in the small group market163 and did not control the high 
prices of coverage that discouraged many small firms from purchasing 
group insurance.164 
More importantly, small group reforms did not eliminate the threat of 
adverse selection. Small group rates were still tied to pools of small 
employers.165 Since small employers could choose whether to buy 
insurance, employers with lower risk and less costly employees could 
avoid the high costs of the small group market by electing to self-insure 
their employees or by opting out of small group coverage altogether. 
                                                     
158. These requirements were put in place to stop insurers from denying coverage to potentially 
costly groups. See id. at 179. 
159. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, HEALTH 
INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 3 (2011), https://www.naic.org/ 
documents/topics_health_insurance_rate_regulation_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BTJ-M3D3] 
(noting that rating bands are “the most prevalent form” of small group rate regulation). 
160. See id. at 1. 
161. Adjusted community rating bars the use of health status or claims experience in the 
calculation of premiums but allows other factors, such as age and geography, to be used. See id. 
162. Pure community rating prohibits any factors besides geography to be used when setting 
premiums. See id. 
163. See Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Small Group Reform and Insurance Provision 
by Small Firms, 1989–1995, 36 INQUIRY 176, 184 (1999) (reporting that small group reforms 
adopted between 1989 and 1995 did not expand coverage among small firms); Marquis & Long, 
supra note 154, at 377 (finding little evidence that small group reforms lead to any expansion of 
coverage among small firms in nine states). 
164. See Jensen & Morrisey, supra note 163, at 184 (reporting that nearly all (90%) small firms 
surveyed that did not offer their employees group health insurance stated that the high cost was the 
most important reason for not offering coverage). 
165. Some states required some form of community rates. In states that did not require 
community rates, insurers still pooled small groups by classes or blocks. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, supra note 159, at 2–3. 
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C. Coda 
The group insurance model has been an awkward fit for small 
employers, generating problems not typically faced by large groups: 
adverse selection, cream skimming, rating difficulties, and market 
volatility. Legislative reforms stabilized the market, but the core 
problem of adverse selection remained. Prior to the ACA, small 
employers that bought small group coverage did benefit from the group 
model. They enjoyed the same tax subsidy as large groups, avoided 
individual underwriting, and appeared to pay lower administrative costs. 
The next Part of this Article examines whether the post-ACA small 
group market provides a better deal than individual coverage. 
III. SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE TODAY: DOES IT 
DELIVER CORE GROUP BENEFITS? 
The ACA changed the way individual and small group health 
insurance is pooled, priced, structured, and delivered.166 Although these 
changes were substantial and are worthy of extended discussion, the 
inquiry in this Article focuses on a specific question: Does the post-ACA 
small group market deliver the four core benefits of the group insurance 
model? This Part answers this question. Section III.A examines whether 
the small group market reduces the risk of adverse selection relative to 
the individual market. Next, section III.B surveys cost data to determine 
whether the small group market delivers coverage at a lower 
administrative expense than the individual market. Section III.C 
evaluates whether the small group market provides greater access to 
coverage than the individual market. Finally, section III.D examines 
whether small group coverage provides a tax subsidy not available in the 
individual market. 
A. Adverse Selection in the Individual and Small Group Markets 
Recall that adverse selection occurs when insurance purchasers know 
more than the insurer about their own risks and use that information 
when they buy insurance. In the individual life insurance market, 
insurers used individual underwriting to combat adverse selection. But 
this came at a cost: high administrative charges and limited access to 
insurance. The group model provided an answer to adverse selection by 
                                                     
166. For an overview of the ACA changes to the individual and small group markets, see John G. 
Day, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: What Does It Really Do?, 22 CONN. INS. L.J. 
121, 135–47 (2016). 
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creating a risk pool for reasons independent of the demand for insurance. 
Prior to the ACA, adverse selection was a problem for both the small 
group and individual markets. After the ACA, adverse selection remains 
a problem for both. 
1. Pre-ACA Adverse Selection 
Prior to the ACA, the individual market was considered a residual 
market,167 where individuals lacking employer-based coverage or who 
were not eligible for public insurance programs sought insurance.168 
Individuals purchased insurance voluntarily, consequently some 
individuals churned in and out of the market as they needed coverage, 
while others kept individual coverage long-term.169 Because individuals 
had an incentive to purchase insurance only when they thought they 
might need medical services, adverse selection was a problem.170 Indeed, 
applicants for coverage were more likely to be high-risk than low-risk.171 
This led insurers to use underwriting and risk-based pricing to control 
risk. Insurers denied coverage to high-risk applicants and priced 
enrollees based on their risk.172 
As noted in Part II, adverse selection was also a problem in the small 
group market before the ACA. Because small group employers entered 
the small group market for the purpose of buying insurance, the adverse 
selection problem in that market was similar to the adverse selection 
problem in the individual health insurance market. Since small 
employers could use their own risk information when deciding to buy 
                                                     
167. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market 
and Prospects for Change, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 79, 79–80 (noting that “only a small 
share of the nonelderly population purchases individual insurance”). 
168. See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-existing Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual 
Insurance Market Prior to the ACA, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 2 (Dec. 12 2016), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Pre-existing-Conditions-and-Medical-Underwriting-in-
the-Individual-Insurance-Market-Prior-to-the-ACA [https://perma.cc/2QC5-WW94]. Public 
insurance programs include Medicare and Medicaid. 
169. See id. 
170. See Mark V. Pauly & Len M. Nichols, The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Short on 
Facts, Long on Opinions and Policy Disputes, HEALTH AFF. W325, W326 (Oct. 23, 2002), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/452d/a53571e394a98f2d71ddc4a753d604962638.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NR8J-EKUE] (arguing that insurers’ fear of adverse selection results in 
underwriting and pricing practices). 
171. Mark J. Browne, Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market, 
59 J. RISK & INS. 13 (1992). 
172. See Buntin et al., supra note 167, at 81 (noting that “those who buy coverage tend to be 
healthier than those who remain uninsured, even though we expect demand for insurance to be 
greatest among the sick”). 
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coverage, this gave them the option of buying coverage in the small 
group market, self-insuring, or skipping coverage all together.173 
2. Post-ACA Adverse Selection 
Part of the ACA’s individual market reforms included making 
individual insurance more accessible. Once the ACA market reforms 
took effect in 2014, insurers in the individual market were no longer 
allowed to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on an 
applicant’s health status or medical history.174 Insurers could only 
determine premiums on a community rated basis, with limited 
adjustments for age, tobacco use, and geographic location.175 This raised 
the risk of adverse selection by barring insurers from using their main 
tools to combat adverse selection. However, the ACA also included 
provisions to reduce adverse selection. The ACA imposed an individual 
mandate that required most Americans to maintain a minimum level of 
health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty.176 The ACA also 
provided subsidies for low- and moderate-income individuals and 
households to help them purchase insurance.177 Moreover, the ACA also 
made it harder for people to delay purchasing insurance until they were 
sick by limiting open enrollment periods.178 
Nevertheless, adverse selection remains a concern in the individual 
market. For example, the individual market has attracted more older than 
younger adults.179 In addition, Congress and the Trump administration 
have taken actions that could increase adverse selection in the individual 
market. Specifically, Congress repealed the individual mandate, 
effective December 31, 2018.180 The Congressional Budget Office has 
estimated that the repeal of the individual mandate will cause fewer 
                                                     
173. Indeed, low risk group declined in coverage following the 1990s reforms, consistent with 
adverse selection. See Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? 
Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1865, 1872 (2005) 
(noting that coverage rates declined for low risk workers after reforms). 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (guaranteed availability of coverage); id. § 300gg-2 (guaranteed 
renewability of coverage); id. § 300gg-3 (prohibition of preexisting condition exclusion); id. 
§ 300gg-4 (prohibition of discrimination based on health status). 
175. Id. § 300gg. 
176. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 539 (2012) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A 
(2012)). 
177. See infra section III.D.  
178. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b). 
179. John A. Graves & Sayeh S. Nikpay, The Changing Dynamics of US Health Insurance and 
Implications for the Future of the Affordable Care Act, 36 HEALTH AFF. 297, 303 (2017). 
180. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017). 
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healthy people to buy insurance, reducing individual market coverage by 
13 million people by 2027.181 The repeal is also expected to cause 
premiums to rise about 10% per year for the next decade.182 In addition, 
the Trump Administration has promulgated regulations that allow the 
sale of low cost, low coverage “short-term” insurance.183 Insurers 
offering this coverage could siphon (or, cream skim) low-risk insureds 
from the individual market and drive up individual market premiums.184 
The small group market also remains subject to adverse selection 
problems. Post-ACA, insurers in the small group market are also barred 
from charging higher premiums based on the health status, medical 
history, or other risk factors of the employees of a small employer. Small 
group coverage is also community rated, subject to limited adjustments 
based on age, smoking, and geography.185 All of this increases the risk of 
adverse selection. Finally, unlike the large group market, there remains 
no rule that requires small employers to either provide health coverage 
to their employees or pay a penalty.186 Small groups can still opt out of 
coverage if they find it too expensive, or they can self-insure. Indeed, the 
number of small employers self-insuring has risen from 13.2% in 
2013,187 the year before the ACA insurance market reforms took effect, 
to 17.4% in 2016.188 Moreover, the Trump Administration has 
                                                     
181. CONG. BUDGET OFF., REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN 
UPDATED ESTIMATE 3 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-
2018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/72F9-PNDG]. 
182. Id. 
183. Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212, 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 148) (effective on October 2, 2018). 
184. See Robert Pear, Trump Moves to Relax Rules on Cheaper Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/politics/trump-cheaper-health-
insurance.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (“Some health policy experts say that if large numbers of 
healthy people buy short-term coverage, it could drive up premiums for those who remain in 
Affordable Care Act plans.”). 
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-4 (2012). 
186. See Day, supra note 166, at 146. 
187. 2013 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary 
Tables, Table I.A.2.a Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance that 
Self-Insure at Least One Plan by Firm Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2013), 
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2013), 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2013/tia2a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C6P6-HBBY]. 
188. 2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary 
Tables, Table I.A.2.a Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance that 
Self-insure at Least One Plan by Firm Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2016), 
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2016), 
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tia2a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8L9-4TGN]. 
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promulgated a regulation that permits small firms to offer coverage 
purchased through associations rather than through the small group 
market.189 This regulation allows small firms to offer less expensive 
coverage exempt from small group market requirements.190 
In sum, post-ACA, both the individual and small group markets are 
subject to adverse selection, and the small group market appears to 
provide no greater protection from adverse selection than the individual 
market. 
B. Administrative Costs in the Individual and Small Group Markets 
The group model lowered administrative costs by eliminating the 
expense of individual underwriting, spreading fixed per-contract costs 
across a larger pool of insureds, and by transferring some administrative 
duties to the employer. Prior to the ACA, available data seemed to 
suggest that the small group market delivered a better deal on 
administrative costs than the individual market. Data now available 
shows that the small group market offers no better deal on administrative 
costs. In fact, administrative costs are higher for the small group market, 
due to the costs of brokers and agents. 
1. Pre-ACA Administrative Costs 
Prior to the ACA, there was little publicly available information on 
how much insurers spent on administrative costs.191 Administrative costs 
were typically reported as the medical loss ratio (MLR), a percentage of 
the premium paid for medical claims.192 Although there was no standard 
formula for calculating MLRs,193 the MLR statistic was widely used by 
insurers, regulators, and many others for a variety of purposes, including 
                                                     
189. Definition of ‘‘Employer’’ under section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 28,912, 28,912 (June 21, 2018) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2150). 
190. See Robert Pear, Trump Proposes New Health Plan Options for Small Businesses, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/trump-association-health-
plans-obamacare.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
191. Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief: Medical Loss Ratio, HEALTH AFF. 1 (Nov. 24, 
2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20101124.949788/full/healthpolicybrief_33. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZBA-J6AZ]. 
192. James C. Robinson, Use and Abuse of the Medical Loss Ratio to Measure Health Plan 
Performance, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 176, 176 (“In principle, this statistic measures the 
fraction of total premium revenue that health plans devote to clinical services, as distinct from 
administration and profit.”). 
193. Id. at 177–81, 186 (noting that MLR “is not a straightforward indicator of either medical or 
administrative expenditures”); see also Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (noting that the meaning of 
MLR differed among states because they “defined what constitutes medical care differently”). 
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as an indicator of administrative efficiency.194 Large groups tended to 
have the highest MLRs ranging from the low eighties to the low 
nineties.195 This meant that administrative costs and profits in the large 
group market varied from under 10% to nearly 20% of premiums. The 
individual market typically had the lowest MLRs, ranging from the low 
sixties to the eighties,196 meaning that administrative costs comprised 
between 20% to nearly 40% of premiums. The small group market fell 
in-between, with MLRs ranging from the high seventies to the mid-
eighties.197 Small group administrative costs and profits ranged from 
15% to the just over 20%. This seems to suggest that, while small group 
administrative costs were high, they were generally not as high as those 
in the individual market—an apparent benefit of the group model. 
But use of the MLR statistic as means of comparing administrative 
expenses across markets can be misleading. The MLR shows 
administrative costs as a percentage of premium rather than in dollars 
spent per person. Because premiums across the three markets varied, 
MLR figures are not particularly useful for cross-market administrative 
cost comparisons. Individual market plans typically provide less 
coverage at a lower premium, so they have fewer premium dollars over 
which to spread their administrative costs.198 This yields a higher MLR 
in the individual market per administrative dollar spent than in the large 
and small group markets. 
                                                     
194. Robinson, supra note 192, at 177 (“Despite the difficulties in access and interpretation, the 
medical loss ratio has achieved in recent years a remarkable amount of publicity and even 
notoriety.”). 
195. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: SMALL EMPLOYERS 
CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES IN PROVIDING COVERAGE 14 (2001) [hereinafter GAO SMALL 
EMPLOYERS], https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232978.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26R-3FEP] (reporting 
large group administrative costs at “about 10 percent of large employers’ premiums,” an MLR of 
90%); Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (noting that the nation’s largest health insurers reported 2009 
MLRs for the large group market ranging from 83%–88%); Hall, supra note 157, at 174 (reporting 
that large group MLRs “typically run in the high 80s or low 90s”). 
196. See, e.g., Hall, Geography, supra note 157, at 175 (reporting individual market MLRs in the 
“60s to mid-70s”); Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (reporting 2009 MLRs for the individual market 
ranging from 68%–88%). 
197. See, e.g., GAO SMALL EMPLOYERS, supra note 195 (reporting small employer 
administrative costs at “about 20 percent to 25 percent,” an MLR of 75–80%); Haberkorn, supra 
note 191, at 2 (noting that the nation’s largest health insurers reported 2009 MLRs for the large 
group market ranging from 83%–88%); Hall, Geography, supra note 157, at 175 (reporting small 
group market MLRs in the “high 70s to mid-80s”).  
198. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND FEDERAL POLICY 35 
(2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51130-
Health_Insurance_Premiums.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU4L-5866] (Appendix: Insurers’ 
Administrative Costs and Profits). 
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2. Post-ACA Administrative Costs 
The ACA now requires all insurers to file detailed financial reports 
annually.199 The data from these reports allows more precise calculations 
of administrative costs. Now, administrative costs can be measured in 
dollars spent per each enrollee, rather than just as a percentage of 
premium. The new data show the small group market has higher 
administrative costs than the individual market. 
Using 2010 to 2012 data, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
analyzed administrative costs for the large group, small group, and 
individual markets.200 The CBO found that, as a share of premiums, 
administrative costs in the individual market were higher than those in 
the small group market, 20% versus 16%. This finding was consistent 
with the prior MLR approach. But when administrative costs were 
measured in average dollars paid by each enrollee, the small group 
market’s administrative costs were 25% higher than those in the 
individual market. As seen in Table 1, per enrollee administrative 
charges—the average number of dollars spent by each enrollee to cover 
administration costs—were higher in the small group market. Annual 
administrative costs in the small group market averaged $687 in 2010-
2012. In the individual market, administrative costs averaged $548 per 
year.  
                                                     
199. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (2012). 
200. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 198, at 36 tbl.A-1. 
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Table 1: 
Insurers’ Average Annual Administrative Costs per Enrollee,  
2010–2012201 
 
Administrative Costs Small Group Market Individual Market 
Claims Processing 
and Adjustment 
$103 
 
$96 
Taxes and Fees $159 $74 
Sales, Marketing, and 
Brokers’ Fees 
$226 $157 
Other Administrative 
Costs 
$200 $221 
Total Administrative 
Costs 
$687 $548 
 
For the two markets, the CBO found that cost of claims processing 
was roughly similar ($103 and $96 per enrollee) as were “other” 
administrative costs ($200 and $221 per enrollee). The two biggest 
differences were in taxes ($159 and $74 per enrollee) and sales, 
marketing, and brokers’ fees ($226 and $157 per enrollee). The tax 
difference resulted from higher profits in the small group market, which 
translated into higher tax costs passed on through premium.202 The most 
significant difference was the cost of sales, marketing, and brokers’ fee, 
which were 44% higher in the small group market ($226 and $157 per 
enrollee).203 
An analysis by the actuarial firm Milliman produced similar results 
for the years 2010 and 2012 to 2015. Table 2 shows average per member 
per month administrative expenses for the small group and individual 
markets. Again, based on the Milliman analysis, the small group market 
was more expensive every year but 2014, when the costs were roughly 
the same ($48.49 versus $48.55).204  
                                                     
201. Id. CBO analyzed administrative data derived from two sources: insurers’ 2010 filings of the 
Supplemental Health Care Exhibit with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and 
insurers’ 2011 and 2012 filings of the Medical Loss Ratio Annual Reporting Form with Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Id. at 35. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. The Milliman figures do not include taxes and fees. 
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Table 2: 
Administrative Costs per Member per Month, 2010, 2012–2015 
 
Year Small Group Market Individual Market 
2010205 $43.83 $40.31 
2012206 $44.38 $38.30 
2013207 $46.37 $43.09 
2014208 $48.49 $48.55 
2015209 $51.94 $48.19 
 
Milliman also noted that the biggest difference between the two 
markets were the broker and agent fees, which were substantially higher 
in the small group market.210 
The group model lowers costs, in part, by transferring some 
administrative functions from the insurer to the firm. Small firms, 
lacking the resources to hire a staff, rely on insurance agents and brokers 
to perform many of the functions of a human resources staff.211 Most 
                                                     
205. JILL S. HERBOLD, MILLIMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES: 2010 COMMERCIAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE 5 fig.1, 8 (2012) [hereinafter MILLIMAN 2010], 
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/health-published/commercial-health-insurance-
admin-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7NV-NTUK]. 
206. MILLIMAN 2012, supra note 7, at 1 fig.1.  
207. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2013 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE: 
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 1 fig.1 (2014), 
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2014/2013-commercial-health-insurance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H687-V29J]. 
208. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2014 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE: 
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 5 fig.3 (2016), 
http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2016/2014-commercial-health-insurance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MEA-PG3C]. 
209. MILLIMAN 2015, supra note 6, at 6 fig.4. 
210. MILLIMAN 2012, supra note 7, at 2 (“Agents and broker fees in the individual market are 
more than 40% less than the small group market on a PMPM basis.”). See also MILLIMAN 2010, 
supra note 205, at 5 fig.1, 8 (noting that “[t]hese significant differences between the market 
averages for agents and brokers fees and commissions account for the majority of the difference in 
total administrative expenses by market”). 
211. Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Employer Perspectives on the Affordable Care Act’s Premiums, 
SHOP Exchanges, and Self-Insurance, 32 HEALTH AFF. 2032, 2034 (2013) (“Insurance agents and 
brokers play major roles in small employers’ purchasing decisions, often serving as de facto benefit 
managers.”); LESLIE JACKSON CONWELL, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF 
NO. 57: THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE BROKERS 3 (2002), 
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/480/480.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9VM-PECW] (noting that 
small employers “tend to view brokers as their benefits staff”). 
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small firms that buy insurance use brokers and agents.212 Brokers and 
agents provide extensive services, including helping firms select health 
plans, educating employees about benefits, enrolling employees, 
determining employee premium contributions, and helping employees 
appeal denied claims.213 But these services come with a price. Brokers 
fees of up to 8% of premium214 are built-in to all premiums rather than 
charged directly to small firms. Thus, all small employers pay for 
brokers and agents, even if they do not use them.215 
In sum, the small group health market offers no administrative cost 
savings. While cost savings through the transfer of some administrative 
functions from the insurer to the employer may work for a large 
employer, it does not work for a small employer. The small employer 
must rely on agents and brokers to perform those functions. The costs of 
those services are simply loaded into premiums and transferred back to 
the small firms, resulting in higher administrative costs. 
C. Access to Insurance in the Individual and Small Group Markets 
Access to insurance is the most straightforward of the group model’s 
four core benefits. The group model jettisoned individual underwriting 
as a prerequisite for life insurance, thereby extending the availability of 
life insurance to those who would have been denied coverage in the 
individual market. Prior to the ACA, the small group market offered the 
same access benefit: small group employees were not subject to 
individual underwriting as a litmus test for coverage, although the 
benefit was provided by statute, not purely through the group model. On 
the other hand, applicants for individual coverage were subject to 
exclusion through underwriting. After the ACA, underwriting was 
eliminated in the individual market and middle- and lower-income 
applicants to that market were eligible for subsidized coverage, blunting 
the high cost of health insurance, which can be a significant barrier to 
coverage. These changes eliminated the access benefit of the small 
group market. 
                                                     
212. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034 (noting that 80% of small firms that offer coverage 
use a broker or agent). A broker is an independent agent who works with many insurers. Agents 
work with a single insurer. See CONWELL, supra note 211, at 2. 
213. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034–35. 
214. See CONWELL, supra note 211, at 2. 
215. See id. 
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1. Pre-ACA Access 
Because medical underwriting was permitted in the individual 
insurance market in forty-five states and the District of Columbia prior 
to the ACA,216 individual insurance was difficult for many Americans to 
purchase.217 More than one in six applicants were denied when applying 
for coverage in the individual market,218 and many others simply did not 
apply because they knew they would be denied.219 Even if a person were 
not denied, their medical history could result in higher rates, an 
exclusion of a specified condition, higher deductibles, or limited or 
modified benefits.220 In fact, by one estimate, over one quarter of the 
population today would be ineligible for coverage under pre-ACA 
underwriting.221 
In contrast, while group coverage was “almost invariably” written 
without individual underwriting prior to the 1960s,222 by the early 1990s, 
40% of small groups and 20% of large firms used medical underwriting 
to exclude workers for specific preexisting conditions.223 This changed 
after passage of HIPAA in 1996. Thereafter, individual underwriting 
was banned in the group health markets. HIPAA prohibited group health 
plans from excluding individuals from a group or charging them higher 
premiums based on their health status.224 HIPAA also included 
guaranteed issue and renewability provisions that prevented insurers 
from refusing coverage to small groups based on the cost of their 
                                                     
216. See Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 3. 
217. Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a 
Viable Option for Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 (July 21, 2009), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_iss
ue_brief_2009_jul_failure_to_protect_1300_doty_failure_to_protect_individual_ins_market_ib_v2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QR3K-SZDK] (“[N]early half (47%) of adults who tried to purchase insurance 
in the individual market in the last three years found it very difficult or impossible to find a plan that 
fit their needs.”). 
218. Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 2 (estimating that 18% of individual market applicants 
were denied coverage); see also Buntin et al., supra note 167, at 81 (noting estimates of denials 
range from 8% to 18% of applicants). 
219. See Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 2–3. 
220. See id. at 6. 
221. See id. at 2, tbl.1 (noting that 27% of adult Americans under the age of sixty-five have health 
conditions that would likely leave them uninsurable in the pre-ACA individual market). 
222. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 63. 
223. See Joel C. Cantor et al., Private Employment-Based Health Insurance in Ten States, 
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 199, 205. 
224. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), (b) (2012).  
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employees.225 Nevertheless, access was limited by price and low offer 
rates. Although most states imposed some restrictions on premiums, 
such as rating bands, to prevent insurers from pricing out employers with 
high-cost employees,226 high premiums still affected access. High prices 
have been the main reason small employers do not offer coverage.227 
And the percentage of small employer not offering coverage has grown 
from about half in the early 1990s to roughly two-thirds today.228 
2. Post-ACA Access 
After the ACA, underwriting is prohibited in the individual market. 
Access to coverage is guaranteed.229 The ACA prohibits discrimination-
based health status230 and preexisting conditions,231 and insurers may 
vary premiums only on family status, geographic rating area, age, and 
tobacco use.232 And, as described in section III.D, the ACA offers tax 
subsidized coverage to middle- and lower-income applicants, reducing 
cost as a barrier to health coverage. 
The same access and rating provisions also apply to the small group 
market, giving the two markets similar access requirements. However, 
two additional potential access limits should be considered. First, the 
small group offers no special tax subsidy to the households most 
burdened by the cost of health insurance—middle- and lower-income 
households. Second, less than one-third of small group employers now 
offer group health coverage.233 
In short, the post-ACA small group health market offers no access 
advantage over the individual market. 
                                                     
225. For a detailed explanation of HIPAA’s guaranteed issue and renewal requirement for small 
groups, see Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing: The 
Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 183, 207–09 (1998). 
226. See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. 
227. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034 (finding that 75% of small firms not offering 
insurance cite the high cost as the reason coverage not offered). 
228. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
229. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012). This is subject to enrollment periods. Id. § 300gg-1(b). 
230.  Id. § 300gg-4. 
231.  Id. § 300gg-3. 
232.  Id. § 300gg(a). 
233. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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D. Tax Subsidy in the Individual and Small Group Market 
Finally, does the small group market deliver a better tax subsidy than 
individual coverage? Prior to the ACA, the answer was unequivocally 
“yes.” Now, the answer rests on the employee’s household income. To 
be clear, employer-based group coverage still offers a tax subsidy. But 
for some employees—those with low or moderate household incomes—
the individual market may offer a better tax subsidy. 
1. Pre-ACA Tax Subsidy 
Before the ACA, federal law generally offered little tax subsidy to 
those who purchased health insurance in the individual market.234 
Individuals paid premiums with after-tax dollars.235 In comparison, 
group premiums paid by an employer on behalf of an employee were not 
treated as employees’ taxable income236 and employee contributions to 
premiums were paid with pre-tax dollars if made through a cafeteria 
plan.237 The result was a significant advantage for employer-based group 
health insurance over the individual market. The subsidies lowered the 
price of insurance purchased through an employer relative to the 
individual insurance market.238 This played a critical role in the growth 
                                                     
234. Self-employed individuals may deduct the cost of their own health insurance premiums as 
well as the premiums they paid for their dependents as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 
I.R.C. § 162(l) (West 2006). Also, employees were allowed to purchase their own health insurance 
and then seek reimbursement in pre-tax dollars from their employer. See infra note 302 and 
accompanying text. 
235. David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: 
Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income 
Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 676 (2012). 
236. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106(a) (West 2012). Group health insurance premiums are also excludable 
from payroll taxes. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), (b), 3121(a)(2) (West 2012). 
237. I.R.C. § 125. Legislation authorizing cafeteria plans was enacted in 1978. Revenue Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 96-600, tit. I, § 134, 92 Stat. 2763, 2783 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 125). 
238. Employees are thought to pay the employer’s contribution in the form of lower wages. See 
Linda J. Blumberg, Who Pays For Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 1999, at 59 (“Economists tend to agree that, based upon both theory and the best empirical 
evidence, workers bear a large portion of health insurance costs through reduced wages.”); David A. 
Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know 
That Aren’t So, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 435, 437 (2009) (“[E]mployees actually foot 
the bill in the form of foregone salary and other benefits.”). The tax benefit makes the wage-benefit 
tradeoff a good deal since dollars paid in the form of wages are taxed but dollars paid in the form of 
on health insurance benefits are not. For an illustration of the tax benefit of group insurance, see 
Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes and Health Insurance, 3–4 (Univ. of 
Minn. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-01, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531322 (last visited Aug. 8, 2018) 
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of employer-based group health insurance. As Melissa Thomasson has 
noted, “[b]y fostering an increase in the demand for group insurance 
relative to individual coverage, [the tax benefit] . . . ensured that health 
insurance in the United States would evolve as a group, employment-
based system.”239 
Significantly, the tax subsidy of employer-provided insurance did not 
depend on the size of the firm,240 but the subsidy may have been a more 
important benefit for small firms. Relying on variations in tax subsidies 
across Canadian provinces and U.S. states, economist Mark Stabile 
showed that provinces and states that offered greater tax subsidies for 
employer-provided insurance tended to have more small firms offer 
insurance than provinces or states that offered smaller tax subsidies.241 
Without the tax subsidy, Stabile concluded, about half of small firms (25 
or fewer employees) would no longer offer coverage, while a loss of tax 
benefits would have little effect on the larger firms, most likely because 
the other benefits of group coverage still made large group coverage a 
better deal than individual coverage.242 
2. Post-ACA Tax Subsidy 
Although the ACA changed some tax laws that affected employer-
based group coverage,243 the tax benefits for employer-provided health 
insurance remained largely the same. However, the ACA substantially 
changed the tax laws for purchasers in the individual market by 
providing: (1) a premium tax credit to subsidize the purchase of health 
                                                     
(demonstrating how a pre-ACA taxpayer in the 25% marginal tax bracket receives a subsidy of 
$1,412 by buying health insurance through an employer’s group plan). 
239. Thomasson, supra note 87, at 1374.  
240. Rather, the subsidy depended on the marginal tax rate of each employee. Mark Stabile, The 
Role of Tax Subsidies in the Market for Health Insurance, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 33, 48 (2002). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 47–48. 
243. The most notable is the ACA’s so-called Cadillac Tax, which imposed a 40% excise tax on 
employer contributions to health plans considered overly generous. Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. IX, § 9901, 124 Stat. 199, 848 (2010) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 4980I (2012)). Congress suspended its operation until 2020. Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. P, tit. I, § 101(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3037 (2015). 
Small employers with fewer than twenty-five full-time employees and average wages of less than 
$50,000 were also offered a tax credit to provide health insurance to employees. The employer had 
to pay at least 50% of the cost of such coverage. The credit is only available for two consecutive 
taxable years. I.R.C. §§ 45R(d), (e)(2). For a discussion of the ACA’s tax provisions, see Gamage, 
supra note 235, at 686–92. 
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insurance244 and (2) cost sharing subsidies to reduce out-of-pocket costs, 
such as deductibles, coinsurance, and copays.245 But not all individual 
market purchasers are eligible for these subsidies. Subsidies are only 
available for policies purchased through state246 or federal247 health 
insurance exchanges.248 To be eligible for the premium tax credit, 
purchasers must have a household income between 100% and 400% 
FPL.249 To receive the cost sharing subsidies, purchasers must have 
income between 100% and 250% of FPL.250 Employees and dependents 
offered “affordable” health insurance by an employer are also not 
eligible for the subsides.251 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate how the subsidies work. Table 3252 estimates 
the premium tax credits, cost sharing subsidies, and total subsidy for a 
family of four with a single earner who bought health insurance from a 
state or federal exchange in 2016.253 The premium tax credit subsidies 
are highest at 100% of FPL254 and thereafter decrease as the purchaser’s 
household income approaches 400% FPL. Likewise, the value of the 
cost sharing subsidies peaks at 100% FPL and decreases as the 
purchaser’s income approaches 250% FPL. Above 400% FPL, buyers 
receive no subsidies. 
 
  
                                                     
244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 
119, 213 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2012)). 
245. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1402, 124 Stat. 
119, 220 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012)). 
246. 42 U.S.C. § 18031. 
247. Id. § 18041. 
248. Health insurance exchanges (also called marketplaces) are online markets in which 
individuals and small businesses can purchase health insurance. For an overview of the health 
insurance exchanges, see generally VANESSA C. FORSBERG, CONG. RESEARC. SERV., No. R44065, 
OVERVIEW OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 1–13 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44065.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK5D-GQAB]. 
249. I.R.C. § 36B (West 2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(b) (2017). 
250. 42 U.S.C. § 18071; 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g) (2017). 
251. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B) (2012), (C); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(c)(3) (2017). 
252. Table 3 is adapted from Gamage, supra note 235, at 688 tbl.1, which was adapted from 
STEPHANIE RENNANE & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, TAX POLICY CTR., HEALTH REFORM: A TWO-
SUBSIDY SYSTEM (2010), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/numbers/ 
content/PDF/S10-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/25JL-FXXT]. 
253. While the figures in this table may vary under the new tax law, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017), the underlying analysis remains the same. Households will 
receive subsidies at 100% that decrease as income approaches 400% of FPL. 
254. From 100% FPL to 133% FPL, households are also eligible for Medicaid coverage in those 
states that expanded Medicaid eligibility under the ACA. See Gamage, supra note 235, at 687 n.93. 
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Table 3: 
Estimated Value of Exchange Subsidies (Family of Four, 2016) 
 
Household 
Income  
(% of FPL) 
Household 
Income 
(Cash) 
Premium 
Tax 
Credits 
(PTC) 
Cost 
Sharing 
Subsidies 
(CSS) 
Total 
Exchange 
Subsidy 
(PTC+CSS) 
100 $24,000 $13,598 $4,834 $18,433 
125 $30,000 $13,473 $4,834 $18,307 
150 $36,000 $12,595 $3,021 $15,617 
175 $42,000 $11,738 $3,021 $14,759 
200 $48,000 $10,940 $604 $11,544 
225 $54,000 $9,869 $604 $10,473 
250 $60,000 $9,053 - $9,053 
275 $66,000 $7,776 - $7,776 
300 $72,000 $6,952 - $6,952 
325 $78,000 $6,468 - $6,468 
350 $84,000 $5,761 - $5,761 
375 $90,000 $5,165 - $5,165 
400 $96,000 $4,570 - $4,570 
425 $102,000 - - - 
450 $108,000 - - - 
 
Table 4255 shows the gains and losses for a family of four if it buys 
subsidized individual market coverage rather than receive employer-
based group coverage. Based on the assumptions of this model,256 the 
tradeoff point for a family of four is right around 400% FPL. A family of 
four with income at or below 400% FPL will realize a financial gain by 
buying subsidized coverage in the individual market rather than through 
                                                     
255. See Gamage, supra note 235, at 696 tbl.2. 
256. The analysis makes several simplifying assumptions that are implied in the data. First, the 
employer offers only cash wages or cash wages and health insurance benefits. See Rennane & 
Steuerle, supra note 252, at 2 n.5. Second, individuals and families get the same health plan in the 
individual market and from the employer, with a premium of $5,200 and cost sharing of $1,900 for 
individuals or a premium of $14,100 and cost sharing of $5,000 for families. See id. at 2 tbl.1, cols. 
(C), (C’), (D), (D’), 4 tbl.3, cols. (C), (C’), (D), (D’). Third, the employer’s costs per employee are 
the same regardless of whether the employer offers group coverage. See id. at 2 tbl.1, cols. (R), (R’), 
4 tbl.3, cols. (R), (R’). Finally, the analysis does not consider income from sources other than the 
employer. Although these assumptions simplify the calculations, they do not alter the final analysis: 
from a tax subsidy perspective, households with lower incomes will be better off choosing 
subsidized individual coverage while households with higher incomes will be better off choosing 
employer-based group coverage.  
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group coverage. Conversely, if the family’s income exceeds 400% FPL, 
it will be worse off if it buys subsidized coverage in the individual 
market rather than through group coverage. 
 
Table 4: 
Estimated Household Gain/Loss in Tax Subsidies 
After Switch to Exchange from Small Group Insurance 
(Family of Four, 2016) 
 
Household 
Income 
(% of FPL) 
Household 
Income 
(Cash) 
Total 
Exchange 
Subsidy 
Total 
Increase in 
Paid Taxes 
Net Benefit 
of Exchange 
Coverage257 
100 $24,000 $18,433 $(124) $18,557 
125 $30,000 $18,307 $2,297 $16,010 
150 $36,000 $15,617 $4,568 $11,049 
175 $42,000 $14,759 $5,536 $9,223 
200 $48,000 $11,544 $5,456 $6,088 
225 $54,000 $10,473 $4,493 $5,980 
250 $60,000 $9,053 $3,544 $5,509 
275 $66,000 $7,776 $3,544 $4,232 
300 $72,000 $6,952 $3,544 $3,408 
325 $78,000 $6,468 $3,544 $2,924 
350 $84,000 $5,761 $3,544 $2,217 
375 $90,000 $5,165 $3,544 $1,621 
400 $96,000 $4,570 $3,544 $1,026 
425 $102,000 - $3,544 ($3,544) 
450 $108,000 - $4,134 ($4,134) 
 
The tradeoff point will vary depending on household size. But, for 
households eligible for subsidized individual coverage, there is an 
income level at which they would realize a larger tax subsidy by 
purchasing health insurance in the individual market. The tradeoff point 
for a family of four in 2016 is an annual income of just above $96,000. 
In sum, post-ACA, the small group market offers only a partial tax 
subsidy advantage over the individual market. For households with 
incomes at or below 400% FPL, the individual market offers a better 
                                                     
257. Since this table assumes only small group coverage, Table 4 does not include a reduction for 
the employer mandate. Gamage and Rennane & Steuerle both incorporate the employer mandate 
and assume the cost of the mandate penalty is passed along to the employee. Gamage, supra note 
235, at 696–97, 696 tbl.3; Rennane & Steuerle, supra note 252, at 2 tbl.1.  
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deal. For higher income households, the small group market still offers a 
better subsidy than the individual market. 
This split benefit raises a difficult question. Given its decline, should 
the small group market be sustained to support this one benefit? While 
tax subsidies have played an influential role in the group health markets, 
it would seem arbitrary to sustain the small group market solely to 
deliver a tax benefit for one group: high-income households. 
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE POSSIBLE 
DEMISE OF THE SMALL GROUP MARKET 
As the analysis in Part III demonstrates, the small group market fails 
to deliver the core benefits of group insurance, with the exception of the 
tax subsidy for high-income households. This Part discusses additional 
considerations raised by these findings. First, section IV.A examines 
whether small group coverage provides consumer benefits, aside from 
the core benefits, that might weigh in favor of preserving the market. 
Section IV.A asks two questions. First, are people more likely to acquire 
and maintain health coverage if it is provided through a group rather 
than the individual market, all else being equal? Second, are employers 
better than employees at selecting health insurance that more closely 
meets the needs of the employees? Next, section IV.B queries whether 
small group insurance benefits employers. Is there a business case for 
small employers to preserve small group coverage? Section IV.C briefly 
discusses various policy changes that have been suggested as ways to 
improve the small group market and considers whether these potential 
fixes would help the small group market deliver group benefits. Finally, 
section IV.D identifies the main winners and losers if the small group 
market is allowed to die. 
A. Does Small Group Coverage Provide Other Consumer Benefits? 
1. Are People More Likely to Acquire Health Coverage if It Is Offered 
Through a Group Market? 
Purchasing health insurance in the individual market can be an 
onerous undertaking fraught with information frictions, time costs, and 
procedural hurdles. Consumers must estimate their health care needs in 
advance, search for coverage (through an online exchange, from an 
04 - Cogan.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2018  5:27 PM 
2018] ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE 1169 
 
insurer directly, or through broker258), and select a single product that 
best meets their needs from an array of options. At the end of each year, 
consumers must reevaluate their coverage needs and either renew their 
plan or select new coverage. The purchasing process is also subject to 
strict time pressures—there is typically a short time frame to purchase 
coverage.259 Once insured, consumers must ensure timely premium 
payments; otherwise coverage will be lost.260 
This cumbersome process is complicated by the limited capacity of 
consumers to effectively shop for insurance. Many consumers have an 
incomplete understanding of key insurance concepts261 and suffer from 
limited health literacy and numeracy.262 Behavioral economics research 
suggests that consumers are rationally bounded—they have a limited 
ability to absorb and process the information relevant to complex 
decision making.263 The result can be flawed choices due to the use of 
mental shortcuts264 and procrastination.265 
                                                     
258. Katherine Hempstead, The Off-Exchange Individual Market and Small Group Market: New 
HIX Compare Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161024.057190/full/ [https://perma.cc/2RU3-
AUNB] (noting that ACA-compliant individual plans are available on an exchange, directly from an 
insurer, or through a broker and that over 25% of ACA-compliant individual market products sold 
in 2016 were sold off the exchange). 
259. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b) (2012) (allowing enrollment to be restricted to limited periods). 
Open enrollment—when anyone could sign up for coverage—runs from November 1 to December 
15. 45 C.F.R. § 155.410(e)(3) (2017). 
260. See Robert Pear, One-Fifth of New Enrollees Under Health Care Law Fail to Pay First 
Premium, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/us/politics/one-in-5-
buyers-of-insurance-under-new-law-did-not-pay-premiums-on-time.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018) (reporting that 20% of new enrollees in the individual market in 2014 pay failed to pay their 
premiums on-time and therefore did not receive coverage). The ACA provides a three-month grace 
period for exchange enrollees who fail to pay premiums timely. 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c)(2)(B)(iv)(II); 
45 C.F.R. § 156.270(g). If, however, coverage is lost through non-payment of premiums beyond the 
grace period, the individual may not simply re-enroll. Instead, she must wait for the next open 
enrollment period to resume exchange coverage. Catherine E. Livingston et al., Third-Party 
Payment of Premiums for Private Health Insurance Offered on the Exchanges, 8 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 1, 9–10 (2015). 
261. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 
J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 858 (2013) (reporting that only 14% of survey respondents could answer 
four simple multiple-choice questions about insurance cost-sharing features and that most 
respondents were unable to accurately estimate the cost of their medical services). 
262. Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of Health Literacy in Health 
Care Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 253, 260 (2011) (noting results from a survey 
conducted in 2003 that found only 12% of the 19,000 adults surveyed were proficient in health 
literacy); Christopher R. Trudeau, Plain Language in Healthcare: What Lawyers Need to Know 
About Health Literacy, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2016, at 36, 37 (noting that about 88% of Americans have 
problems understanding health information). 
263. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1143 (2000) (“To save 
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Group coverage, on the other hand, provides a more streamlined 
process for obtaining and maintaining health insurance, thereby reducing 
the potential hitches and hassles that could prevent or interrupt 
individual market coverage. Plan choice is simplified; the employer 
offers only a limited number of plans. Enrollment occurs at the 
beginning of employment, payment for coverage is made by the 
employer, and the employee’s contribution is deducted from payroll. 
Enrollment continues so long as the employee remains employed and 
does not cancel coverage. The simplicity and tidiness of this process 
suggests that group coverage may be more effective at achieving 
enrollment than the individual market.266 
Intuitively this seems correct; people may be more likely, assuming 
comparable coverage and prices in both markets, to acquire and maintain 
coverage in the group market than the individual market. Yet there is no 
evidence to support this claim. Moreover, there is some evidence that 
employment-based group plans do not always translate into coverage—
even in cases where the employer covers the premium (that is, the 
worker pays no additional premium above wages), and the employee has 
no other access to coverage.267 In a study by Chernew et al., which 
examined the effect of premium reductions on participation in employer-
sponsored health plans by low-income workers employed by small 
firms, the authors estimated that even when the employer paid 100% of 
the premium, approximately 10% of low-income individuals remained 
                                                     
time, avoid complexity, and generally make dealing with the challenges of daily life tractable, actors 
ofteu [sic] adopt decision strategies or employ heuristics that lead to decisions that fail to maximize 
their utility.”). 
264. Id. See also Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choices, 
Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1106 (2012) (“Insurance purchasing is 
widely believed to be an area in which humans are extremely susceptible to cognitive biases and 
flawed decision-making.”). 
265. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
121, 124 (2001) (finding that additional options and important decisions can induce 
procrastination). 
266. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 137–38 (2017) 
(“Tying health insurance to the labor deal increases the likelihood that it will be purchased . . . .”). 
267. See Michael Chernew et al., The Demand for Health Insurance Coverage by Low-Income 
Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full Coverage?, 32 HEALTH SERV. RES. 453, 464–66 
(1997) (estimating that about 10% of low-income workers remain uninsured, even if the employer 
charges no premium and the worker has no other source of coverage); Philip F. Cooper & Jessica 
Vistnes, Workers’ Decisions to Take-up Offered Health Insurance Coverage: Assessing the 
Importance of Out-of-Pocket Premium Costs, 41 MED. CARE III-35, III-42 (2003) (finding results 
similar to Chernew et al., but, due to data limitations, unable to exclude workers with outside 
sources of insurance).  
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uninsured.268 The authors offered several possible explanations for this 
finding. One possibility was that these individuals preferred to remain 
uninsured. While this preference could be irrational, for example due to 
the belief by some of these individuals that they will never need medical 
care, Chernew et al. also noted that the decision to remain uninsured 
could also be rational.269 For instance, some health insurance includes 
expensive cost-sharing that would not be waived by health care 
providers, and uninsured low-income individuals might be better off 
forgoing insurance in favor of low- or no-cost public care for both 
emergent and non-emergent medical needs.270 Another possibility was 
that these individuals could have been deterred by the administrative 
costs of enrolling or that they lacked sufficient information about the 
benefits of the insurance and simply skipped coverage.271 In short, there 
may be personal and financial factors that could deter an individual’s 
decision to take up coverage, even in the context of group insurance 
without premium. The study also suggests that group coverage may still 
present information and administrative barriers that impede coverage by 
some individuals. 
2. Are Employers Better than Employees at Selecting Health 
Insurance? 
A second potential consumer benefit is that employers can act as 
sophisticated and beneficial purchasing agents by selecting health 
insurance that more closely meets the needs of their employees. Unlike 
individual market consumers, employers (or their brokers or agents) 
have more resources to devote to the purchase of health insurance,272 
and, unlike consumers, are not disadvantaged by bounded rationality.273 
Moreover, employers have, at least in theory, an incentive to provide 
optimal coverage. Because employers vie for employees in a competitive 
labor market, and because employees are thought to value health 
                                                     
268. Chernew et al., supra note 267, at 466. 
269. Id. at 467. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. Indeed, the authors observe that many low-income individuals also forego public 
benefits, such as food stamps, despite their eligibility, due to barriers such as information deficits or 
perceived administrative burdens. Id. Also, the authors raise the possibility that the 10% uninsured 
figure could be a statistical artifact. However, they discount this possibility by noting that estimates 
for coverage of other subsets of individuals in the study were highly accurate. Id. at 466–67. 
272. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 30. 
273. See id. (noting that employers provide “informational intermediation” for their employees, 
compensating for their bounded rationality). 
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insurance coverage, employers face pressure to offer attractive plans; 
otherwise they risk losing employees to firms that offer more favorable 
coverage.274 Perhaps this explains why survey data suggests that most 
employees are satisfied with their employer’s choice of plans.275 
But there is no evidence to support the notion that employers are 
superior purchasers of insurance. Moreover, the employer-employee 
relationship is fundamentally adversarial with respect to compensation 
and benefits.276 While the employee benefits from coverage, the 
employer picks the terms and cost of the insurance benefit. And survey 
data suggests that employers are more likely to choose a health 
insurance plan based on their own financial interests rather than on the 
preferences of their employees.277 
B. Does Small Group Coverage Benefit Employers? 
Do small firm employers benefit from offering health coverage? The 
answer appears to be “largely, no” with a possible exception for small 
employers employing high-income workers. 
Group coverage is thought to provide two benefits to employers. First, 
“[e]mployers might benefit from providing health insurance . . . if it 
allow[s] them to recruit and retain high-quality workers.”278 The 
assumption underlying this belief is that group coverage provides a 
better deal than individual coverage—it is less expensive, subsidized by 
taxes, and accessible without individual underwriting. If true, offering 
group coverage could help employers attract and retain quality 
                                                     
274. See Jonathan T. Kolstad & Michael E. Chernew, Quality and Consumer Decision Making in 
the Market for Health Insurance and Health Care Services, 66 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 28S, 31S 
(2009); Pamela B. Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents 
for Their Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 7 (2000) (“Economists would argue that employers are 
likely to act effectively as agents because, if they do not, they will ultimately bear the cost of that 
ineffectiveness in higher total compensation costs and/or greater employee turnover.”). 
275. See Peele et al., supra note 274, at 19 (finding that large employers “perform reasonably 
well as agents for their individual employees in the health insurance market”). 
276. See Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257, 
1261 (2016). 
277. See Employer Perspectives on the Health Insurance Market: A Survey of Businesses in the 
United States: Research Highlights, ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH, 
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/employer-perspectives-on-the-health-
insurance-market-a-survey-of-businesses-in-the-united-states-research-highlights.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4G45-W5JS] (reporting survey finding that 86% of employers that offer health 
insurance say the cost to the organization is very or extremely important, while less than 40% said 
employee preference was important). 
278. See Ellen O’Brien, Employers’ Benefits from Workers’ Health Insurance, 81 MILBANK Q. 5, 
6 (2003). 
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employees. But to the extent that small group coverage does not provide 
a better deal than individual coverage to low- and moderate-income 
workers, there is little reason to think that offering group coverage will 
help small firms recruit and retain high-quality workers from those 
groups. Low- and moderate-income workers get a better tax subsidy if 
they buy individual insurance from an exchange and risk losing the 
better subsidy if they are offered “affordable” small group coverage.279 
On the other hand, small employers who want to attract and retain higher 
income workers—those with household incomes over 400% FPL and 
who get no tax subsidy in the individual market—could benefit from 
offering group health insurance. 
Second, there is thought to be a “business case” for offering group 
coverage. Offering coverage can improve the employer’s bottom line by 
reducing some employee-related costs. Based on a review of relevant 
scholarship, however, economist Thomas Buchmueller concluded that 
offering employer-based health insurance has limited potential to offer 
four “spillover benefits” to small employers: (1) reduced turnover, 
(2) lowered workers’ compensation costs, (3) reduced absenteeism, and 
(4) increased productivity.280 As Buchmueller noted: 
The most promising source of spillover benefits comes from the 
fact that health insurance is negatively associated with employee 
turnover. However, the benefit of reducing turnover . . . is likely 
to be smallest for the types of firms that are least likely to offer 
insurance—small firms employing less-skilled workers. The 
scholarly literature provides even less support for the notion that 
offering health insurance will reduce employers’ costs 
associated with workers’ compensation or employee 
absenteeism. Similarly, the literature gives no reason for 
employers to expect that offering insurance will cause worker 
productivity to increase dramatically. Thus, it appears that for 
the small firms that choose not to offer health benefits, the 
decision is one that makes sound business sense.281 
                                                     
279. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
280. THOMAS C. BUCHMUELLER, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH 
BENEFITS: A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 18 (2000), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ab68/d2bf7205938d1b6fc2ffa16c75e472302e5b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/34BG-4JPB]. 
281. Id. But see O’Brien, supra note 278, at 34–35 (arguing that more study is needed).  
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C. Proposed Improvements to the Small Market: Will They Deliver 
Group Benefits? 
Scholars and policymakers have offered various suggestions to 
improve the small group market, including regulating or prohibiting 
stop-loss insurance to reduce small firm self-insurance; promoting the 
use of an online exchange, such as the Small Business Health Options 
Program (SHOP) exchange; and merging the small and individual 
markets.282 If any of these fixes are implemented, will the small group 
market deliver group benefits? Will these policy changes help the small 
group market offer a better deal than the individual market? Probably 
not. No doubt, these suggested changes, if implemented, could very well 
improve how the small group market performs. But they are unlikely to 
transform small group insurance into a better deal for insureds than 
individual coverage. 
1. Restricting Stop-Loss Insurance 
Self-insurance was appealing for small firms before the ACA. Self-
insured plans were not subject to state insurance laws, including 
mandated benefits requirements, premium taxes, and consumer 
protection requirements.283 The ACA has made self-insurance even more 
desirable for some firms, especially those with younger and healthier 
employees, because it can provide lower premiums than a community-
rated small group market pool.284 It also exempts small firms from the 
ACA’s small group market reforms.285 
To slow the spread of self-insurance by small firms, many have 
recommended limits on stop-loss insurance.286 Stop-loss coverage covers 
the employer’s losses above a certain threshold287 and protects small 
                                                     
282. For a wide-ranging discussion of policy options to “save” the small group market, see 
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1975–87. 
283. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2037. 
284. Id. 
285. See Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 550–52. 
286. See, e.g., Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2039 (“To prevent this potential erosion of 
insurance, states need to reform their stop-loss markets so that stop-loss coverage is not de facto 
health insurance.”); Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 556 (arguing that the federal and state governments 
should regulate stop-loss coverage to protect the small group market); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra 
note 9, at 1975–77. 
287. This is the attachment point, which is the dollar amount where stop-loss insurance begins to 
pay claims. See Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 546. 
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employers from large claims that could bankrupt the firm.288 By making 
stop-loss coverage less attractive or available to small firms, the number 
of small firms choosing to self-insure could decrease,289 possibly 
reducing adverse selection against the small group market. But 
regulation of stop-loss will not solve the small group market’s adverse 
selection problem. If a small firm is denied the ability to buy stop-loss 
insurance (or denied the amount of stop-loss insurance it wants), it can 
still select against the small group market by self-insuring anyway (at 
greater risk) or by opting out of coverage completely. Moreover, 
restricting stop-loss coverage will not transform small group coverage 
into a better deal than individual coverage by lowering administrative 
costs, increasing access, or altering existing tax subsidies. 
2. Promoting SHOP Exchanges 
SHOP exchanges are online marketplaces through which small 
employers can provide coverage to their employees. SHOP exchanges 
were designed to provide, among other things, administrative services to 
small firms.290 Most small firms use brokers and those brokers provide 
many administrative services to small firms,291 driving up the cost of 
coverage. Since the SHOP exchanges were expected to perform many of 
the same administrative functions at a lower cost, they were anticipated 
to be a less expensive alternative to brokers.292 This is one of the reasons 
advocates have argued for increased use of SHOP exchanges. In 
addition, some small firms using SHOP exchanges are also eligible for a 
temporary tax credit.293 But there are two impediments to reaping the 
benefits of the SHOP exchanges. 
                                                     
288. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1966 (“In the absence of [stop-loss] coverage, a 
single employee or employee family member becoming very sick could jeopardize a small 
employer’s business.”). 
289. Id. at 1975 (“[M]aking stop-loss insurance less available to small employers . . . could 
decrease the attractiveness of self-insurance for these employers.”). Of course, some small firms 
might continue to self-insure without stop-loss, ultimately relying on the bankruptcy process should 
they be unable to pay employee claims. 
290. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2033. 
291. See id. at 2038. 
292. See id. (“The SHOP exchanges will perform many of the same functions [as brokers], and 
with superior technology and economies of scale they will be able to do so at a lower cost than 
brokers can offer.”). 
293. See id. at 2033, 2036. 
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First, the SHOP exchanges have not worked out as planned. 
Enrollment has been disappointing294 and few small firms have taken 
advantage of the tax break, for multiple reasons, including its short two-
year duration, the significant costs and complexities required to claim 
the tax credit, and the small size of the credit.295 As a result, the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services has ended the federal SHOP 
exchanges,296 which operated in thirty-three states.297 SHOP exchanges, 
however, are not dead. More than a dozen states still operate SHOP 
exchanges. But there is a catch when trying to get small firms to the 
SHOP exchanges. This is the second problem. Brokers remain a major 
source of information and guidance for small firms. To be successful, 
SHOP exchanges have to rely on brokers to drive them business. But 
brokers will not do so if they lose commissions by sending small 
employers to the SHOP.298 This creates a Catch-22 of sorts: 
administrative costs can be lowered in the SHOP exchanges, but small 
firms are unlikely to go to SHOP exchanges unless brokers earning high 
commissions bring small employers to the SHOP exchanges. 
3. Merging the Small and Individual Markets 
The ACA gives states the ability to merge their individual and small 
group health insurance markets.299 But this option would not combine all 
aspects of these markets. Instead, there would only be a merger of the 
small group and individual market risk pools.300 This would create a 
                                                     
294. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-58, SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGES: LOW ENROLLMENT LIKELY DUE TO MULTIPLE, EVOLVING FACTORS 20–22 (2014), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666873.pdf [https://perma.cc/25GR-HPMR].  
295. See JAMES R. MCTIGUE, JR., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-491T, SMALL 
EMPLOYER HEALTH TAX CREDIT: LIMITED USE CONTINUES DUE TO MULTIPLE REASONS 5–10 
(2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675969.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5RT-5D45]. 
296. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE FUTURE OF THE SHOP: CMS INTENDS TO 
ALLOW SMALL BUSINESSES IN SHOPS USING HEALTHCARE.GOV MORE FLEXIBILITY WHEN 
ENROLLING IN HEALTHCARE COVERAGE (2017), 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/The-Future-of-the-
SHOP-CMS-Intends-to-Allow-Small-Businesses-in-SHOPs-Using-HealthCaregov-More-
Flexibility-when-Enrolling-in-Healthcare-Coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFP5-LVYA]. 
297. See Timothy Jost, CMS Announces Plans to Effectively End the SHOP Exchange, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG (May 15, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170515.060112/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/4EJP-FAR3]. 
298. Jon R. Gabel et al., An Early Look at SHOP Marketplaces: Low Premiums, Adequate Plan 
Choice in Many, but Not All, States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 732, 739 (2015). 
299. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(3) (2012). 
300. JILL S. HERBOLD, MILLIMAN, MERGING THE INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP MARKETS 1 
(2011), https://www.in.gov/healthcarereform/files/Merge_Ind_SG.pdf [https://perma.cc/89NC-
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larger and more stable risk pool for the purpose of projecting future 
rates, but a larger risk pool will not stop small group adverse selection, 
reduce small group high administrative costs, increase access, or alter 
existing tax subsidies. In short, a merged risk pool would do nothing to 
improve the small group market’s ability to provide a better insurance 
deal than the individual market. 
D. Who Wins and Who Loses if the Small Group Market Dies? 
The demise of the small group market would yield two big winners: 
the individual market and insurers who sell in that market. First, the 
individual market is the most logical landing spot for the 14.7 million 
people with small group coverage. While it is unlikely that all 
14.7 million customers would shift to the small group market, the 
millions that would move to the individual market would make the that 
market larger, more stable, and less susceptible to rate fluctuations. 
Second, insurers in the individual market could benefit from the 
potential for greater profits from a larger customer base and more 
stability in the market. 
The biggest losers would be the insurance companies (and their 
brokers and agents) that sell small group coverage, and households 
insured through the small group market with incomes above 400% FPL. 
Despite the market’s declining enrollment, insurers in the small group 
remain profitable.301 If the small group market were allowed to decline 
and die, those insurers (and their brokers and agents) would lose a 
profitable line of business. Additionally, households insured through the 
small group market with incomes above 400% FPL would be losers if 
those households had no other access to group coverage. If forced into 
the individual market, those households would lose their group tax 
subsidy and be ineligible for exchange subsidies. They would pay much 
more for their insurance. Yet if Congress wanted to maintain a tax 
benefit for these households, it could do so by allowing small employers 
to reimburse their employees for individually purchased health insurance 
                                                     
8RE8] (observing that the ACA’s merger provision “means that individual premium amounts and 
small group premium amounts are based on the combined health cost experience of the small group 
and individual risk pools. This does not automatically require health benefit plans and premium 
amounts in the individual and small group markets to be the same.”). 
301. See Tammy Tomczyk & Peter Kaczmarek, New Analysis: Enrollment and Profitability 
Trends in the Individual and Small-Group Markets, OLIVER WYMAN HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2016), 
http://health.oliverwyman.com/maximize-value/2016/09/new_analysis_enroll.html 
[https://perma.cc/8NLL-E2W2] (reporting that small group insurers continue to be profitable, 
though profits have been declining). 
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with pre-tax dollars, as they had been allowed to do prior to the ACA.302 
Indeed, federal law does permit some small employers without group 
health coverage to reimburse employees for individual health insurance 
premiums, but only under limited circumstances.303 
CONCLUSION 
Group insurance has long been the dominant vehicle for delivering 
health insurance in this country. The reason for that dominance was 
simple: group health coverage offered insurance buyers a better deal 
than the individual market. Prior to the ACA, this better deal was true 
for small group coverage, despite the adverse selection problems and 
volatility of the small group market. The ACA, however, altered this 
calculation by changing the nature of the individual market. As a result, 
the small group market no longer offers a better deal than the individual 
market with respect to three of the four core benefits of the group model: 
reduced adverse selection, lower administrative costs, and increased 
access to coverage. With respect to the fourth benefit, tax subsidies, 
there is a split. Although the small group market continues to deliver the 
tax benefits it did before, low- and moderate-income households will get 
a better tax subsidy in the individual market. Households above 400% 
FPL, which are excluded from subsidies in the individual market, will do 
better in the small group market. 
Of course, additional dismantling of the ACA will alter this analysis. 
But if the ACA remains in place, one thing seems clear: absent further 
intervention, the small group market will continue to decline. The 
findings in this Article suggest that scholars, legislators, and 
policymakers should respond carefully to the problems of the current 
                                                     
302. Beginning in 1961, employees were allowed to purchase their own insurance and then seek 
reimbursement in pre-tax dollars from their employer. Rev. Ruling 61-146, 1961-2 C.B. 25. This 
came to an end under the ACA. I.R.S. Notice 2015-17 (April 6, 2015) (noting in Guidance Answer 
1 that arrangements under which an employer reimburses an employee for premium expenses 
incurred for an individual market health insurance policy fail to comply with the ACA market 
reforms and may subject the employer to an excise tax under I.R.C. § 4980D (2012)); I.R.S. Notice 
2013-54 (Sept. 13, 2013) (stating in Guidance Answer 1 that employer payment plans that 
reimburse employees for individual market health insurance premiums fail to meet required ACA 
market reforms for group health plans). 
303. Small employers can provide tax-favored reimbursements to employees for the purchase of 
individual health insurance by setting up a “qualified small employer health reimbursement 
arrangement” (QSEHRA) that meets specific criteria. The employer must not offer group health 
coverage to any of its employees, the QSEHRA must be offered to all full-time employees, no 
salary reductions are permitted, and annual employer contributions are capped at $4,950 for a single 
individual or $10,000 for a family, subject to indexing. I.R.C. § 9831(d) (West 2012 & West Supp. 
IV 2016); I.R.S. Notice 2017-67 (Oct. 31, 2017). 
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small group market and ask: What benefits does the small group market 
offer and what would the health insurance landscape would look like if 
no further efforts to prop up the small group market were taken? 
 
